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Abstract

As elections are increasingly plagued by malpractice, violence, systemic manipulation, and
corruption, electoral administrators worldwide view Information and Communication
Technology (ICT)-based solutions as convenient and cost-effective in enhancing electoral
integrity. ICT optimists contend that digitization enhances efficiency, speed, and
detectability of fraud and manipulation, and thereby improves the quality of elections. ICT
skeptics, however, argue that digitization reduces voters’ confidence in elections as these
technologies are susceptible to new vulnerabilities such as hacking, breakdown, and
programmatic manipulation. While arguments on both sides are appealing, there has been
very little systematic effort to empirically test these assertations. This dissertation partially
fills this void and uses a multilevel mixed-effects ordered logistic model to assess whether
or not the usage of ICTs in four aspects of the electoral process – voter registration, voter
identification, election result processing, and publication of results – improves perceived
electoral integrity. The analysis reveals mixed evidence of both hope and hype. The
findings indicate that countries using “biometric data” in voter identification at polling
stations are more likely to have elections with higher levels of perceived electoral integrity.
Contrastingly, countries using “electronic tabulation” for processing results are more likely
to have elections with decreased levels of perceived electoral integrity.
Keywords: ICTs in Elections, ICT and electoral integrity, e-tabulation, biometric
registration, electoral administration and digital technology.

Chapter 1: Introduction

The application of Information and Communication Technologies (ICTs) in elections has
become a notable feature of modern digital democracy across the globe (Yard, 2010; Evrensel,
2010). Electoral Management Bodies (EMBs) in developed and emerging democracies use a
variety of digital technologies – Biometric Voter Registration (BVR) kits, fingerprint technologies,
optical scanners, computerized voting processes, Electronic Voting Machines (EVMs), and
electronic tabulation to tally votes and transmit results. This digitization of the electoral process
and the diffusion of ICTs at all stages of the electoral cycle has accelerated by view that “going
digital” is part of “reinventing government” (Dawes, 2008; NPR, 1993) in the information age.
The process is often generously supported by international donors because of a widely shared
belief that biometric-based voter rolls and other ICT-based solutions can offset concerns related to
electoral integrity and political challenges to election outcomes (Evrensel, 2010).
These new technologies offer opportunities to modernize the electoral process. The
application of technology has been effective particularly in large-scale data entry, voter registration
and management (Yard, 2010). Where elections have been plagued by malpractice, and systemic
and procedural corruption, there is a sense that new technologies offer a convenient and costeffective alternative to correct the shortcomings of traditional electoral processes (Cheeseman,
Lynch, and Willis, 2018). ICTs potentially increase the efficiency, speed, and accuracy of elections
by reducing the “information costs” of participation (Norris, 2004). The allure of new technologies
has been powerful.
Technology enthusiasts contend that digitization improves the overall quality of electoral
processes, mainly because of these three underlying reasons (Cheeseman, Lynch, and Willis,
2

2018): (i) technological support augments the efficiency and performance of election commissions
and electoral officials; (ii) digitization reduces reliance on humans, and thus guards against
manipulation and malpractice; and (iii) technology improves the credibility of the electoral
process, brings clarity in the system, and thus enhances the overall integrity of elections. Moreover,
Callen et al. (2016) argue that ICTs can improve the transparency of elections by “cheaply and
quickly aggregating diffused information” (p.4).
Though a booming election technology industry tends to equate technology with progress
(Yard, 2010), the claim that ICTs revolutionize the electoral process often overlooks the pitfalls of
digitized elections. In some instances, the introduction of new technologies delivers on the
preponderance of what is promised; however, there are also cases where digitization has been
ineffective, mainly because of the lack of preparedness and training of the electoral staff, and
inadequate infrastructural support to reap the potential benefits of technological deployment
(Cheeseman et al., 2018)
From election practitioners to academics, skeptics raise serious doubts about the long-term
sustainability of the digitization of the electoral process because of ICTs’ hard-to-detect
vulnerabilities and challenges. Michael Yard (2010) argues, ICTs’ “black box” approach to
establish centralized control and maintain effective “development and deployment” take “…
power away from the many (election officials, party agents, observers, media), and [puts it] into
the hands of the few” (p. 12). Lee et al. (2010) assert that the existing technology used in electronic
voting machines cannot satisfy concerns about the trustworthiness of elections. Stewart (2009)
finds evidence that “…users of DREs [Direct-Recording Electronic] were less confident that their
votes were counted as cast, compared to users of other voting equipment” (p.3). Barken (2013), in
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a case study on Kenya, argues that high-tech solutions fail because EMBs often overlook the
broader government management structure to ensure the intended impact of these technologies.
As of early 2020, owing to the catastrophic consequences of a global public health crisis
(COVID-19), elections worldwide have been canceled, postponed, or held under stringent health
measures to contain the transmission of the virus. These enormous challenges to elections put
pressure on electoral administrators, legislators, and policymakers to ponder alternative voting
procedures, reconsider election timelines, and implement health safety measures to conduct free,
fair, and credible elections. The reeling effect of these changes on democracy and elections has yet
to be assessed, but the coronavirus, once again, has strengthened the debate related to the
convenience, accessibility, and participation in elections, and overall perceptions of electoral
integrity
These debates and the broad proposition that digital technology enhances the integrity of
elections merit systematic investigation 1. As countries spend hundreds of millions of dollars to

1

The idea of this dissertation was initially conceived while I was working as a graduate research assistant at the Carter

Center’s Democracy Program. After working for months with , David Carroll, Director of the Democracy Program,
he and I presented the preliminary findings at the 2018 Pre-APSA Workshop: Building Better Elections: New
Challenges in Electoral Management held at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) in Cambridge. Soon
after the presentation, we co-authored, “Assessing the Impact of Information and Communication Technologies
on Electoral Integrity” (Haque & Carroll, 2020), which appeared in Election Law Journal. The current dissertation is
the culmination of that research. The initial publication can be cited as:
Haque, Z., & Carroll, D. (2020). Assessing the Impact of Information and Communication Technologies on Electoral
Integrity. Election Law Journal: Rules, Politics, and Policy, 19(2), 1-22.
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acquire these new election technologies and train election officials, it is important to examine the
practical impacts of these technologies on elections. Though a growing volume of research
documents the progress and pitfalls of digitization of elections (Cheeseman et al., 2018; Piccolino,
2016), very few studies analyze empirical evidence in support of these debates. This dissertation
aims to address this significant inadequacy in the existing literature by investigating the empirical
evidence regarding the impact of digitization on the perceived integrity of elections.
The central hypothesis (H1) tested in this dissertation is whether the use of ICTs in elections
improve the perception of electoral integrity. This dissertation employs a multilevel mixed-effects
ordered logistic regression model drawing on cross-sectional observations from 160 countries. It
assesses the use of ICTs in four aspects of the electoral process: voter registration; voter
identification; election result processing; and the transmission and publication of election results.
Data on these four processes are available through International IDEA’s ICTs in Elections
database. The primary dependent variable in most of these regressions are the “rating of electoral
integrity” (rating), measured on a scale of 1-10 (1 =very poor and 10= very good). Data for this
variable is obtained from the Perception of Electoral Integrity (PEI) country-level database. A
series of regression models have been run to distinctly assess which types of ICTs tend to enhance
the perception of electoral integrity.
The regression analyses yield mixed evidence. On the one hand, key findings indicate that
countries using biometric ICT for voter identification at polling stations are more likely to have
elections with higher levels of perceived integrity. On the other hand, some findings show that
countries where election results are processed by an electronic tabulation system are more likely
to have decreased levels of perceived electoral integrity (Haque & Carroll, 2020).

5

Defining Technologies
ICTs in elections refer to “…. software programs and electronic equipment, such as
computers, printers, scanners, bar code readers 2….” In this dissertation, “digital technology,” “new
technology” or just “ICTs” have been used interchangeably to define a specific set of digital
hardware/programs/software or any equipment that is being deployed by electoral commissions
across the globe, particularly in voter registration, voter verification and identification, counting
of votes, and result transmission. These technologies may range from computer-based operations,
BVR, database management systems, optical scanners, fingerprint technology for voter
identification, specialized electronic and mechanical devices (e.g. electronic voting machines),
networked communications, and electronic tabulations. The following key features are useful in
identifying these digital technologies:
i.

Actor: Electoral commissions are the sole custodians of these technologies/
equipment in terms of their operations and implementation, distribution and
management, system update and maintenance, and security and reliability.
EMBs’ internal technical teams or any external vendor ensures the operability
of this equipment.

ii.

Arrangement: The procurement, budget, and implementation of these digital
technologies are codified by the electoral laws of respective countries.

iii.

Purpose: These technologies, oftentimes, are deployed as a way to
revolutionize logistical capacity of EMBs with a view to reducing human errors
and rendering cleaner and more transparent election outcomes.

2

http://aceproject.org/ace-en/topics/et/introduction/default
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Digital Technologies and Electoral Integrity
While there are gaps between developed and developing countries in terms of the
sophistication of digitization processes, the application of ICTs is prevalent at all stages of the
electoral cycle. International IDEA estimates that only 11% of countries conduct elections without
the application of ICTs (Wolf, 2017a). Why do Electoral Management Bodies use ICTs to conduct
elections, and how do these ICT innovations contribute to electoral integrity? Systematic
assessments of these questions remain inadequate; however, research on ICTs, transparency, and
e-government (Bertot et al., 2010; Shim & Eom, 2008; Relly & Sabharwal, 2009; Von
Haldenwang, 2004) indicates that ICTs act as alternative tools to curb corruption and thereby
enhance transparency. Bertot et al. contend that ICT-based initiatives
…Reduce corruption by promoting good governance, strengthening reformoriented initiatives, reducing potential for corrupt behaviors, enhancing
relationships between government employees and citizens, allowing for citizen
tracking of activities, and by monitoring and controlling behaviors of government
employees” (2010, p. 265).
Von Haldenwang (2004) suggests that many governments opt to use ICTs to promote
efficiency and transparency. Shim and Eom’s (2008) empirical assessment indicates that the use
of ICTs boosts internal and managerial control over corrupt behaviors due to the enhanced ability
to promote accountability within the government. International IDEA (2015) also posits that
technology streamlines electoral processes by reducing the reliance on humans in conducting
elections. Electoral malpractice tends to be high where there are low risks of detection of fraud
and higher opportunities for benefits. ICTs have the potential to curtail these opportunities of
electoral misconduct, and can reduce unnecessary human intervention in government work (Shim
7

& Eom, 2009). Norris (2004) assesses the benefits of electronic voting and finds that it potentially
increases the efficiency, speed, and accuracy of elections by reducing the “information costs” of
participation.
While the use of electronic voting mechanisms and the adoption of other technologies is
growing, the phenomenon has become a matter of political contention between techno-skeptics
and techno-enthusiasts. In many ways, these debates are not new. From the lever-operated voting
machines in the 1890s to the punch card voting system in the 1960s, modernization of the electoral
process has been controversial. The rift is caused by divergent perceptions around four major
issues: (a) the potential cost-benefits of digitization of the electoral process; (b) convenience vs.
hacking and new unintended vulnerabilities; (c) sustainability of these new technologies; and (d)
disinformation and citizens’ confidence in the integrity of these technologies. Existing research
provides a detailed analysis of these debates. Studies dwell on biometric registration and
identification (Debrah, 2018; Yakubu & Adjei, 2014; Tilwani et al., 2013; Gold, 2012), Internet
voting (Warkentin et al., 2018; Stockemer, 2018), touch-screen voting (Card & Moretti, 2007),
electronic tabulation (Pesado et al., 2016; Conway et al., 2017) and electronic voting (Wang et al.,
2018; Simpson & Storer, 2017; García, 2015; Krimmer, 2012; Lee et al., 2010; Khasawneh et al.,
2008; Riera & Brown; 2003).
ICT advocates believe that biometric registration, digitized voter lists, electronic voting
machines, and fingerprint technology for voter identification reduce both time, costs and reliance
on humans to conduct elections, and, thereby, reduce corruption and electoral malpractice. This is
a view that digitization of electoral administration accelerates the performance of EMBs and
facilitates greater control and surveillance over the management of elections.

8

Cyber pessimists fear that computerized voting procedures reduce electoral credibility
because these technologies are not necessarily equipped with third party verification mechanisms.
They often raise the issue of digital literacy – generally defined as the ability to understand,
evaluate, and process information on digital or ICT platforms – and argue that these advanced
voting technologies might alienate some groups of voters, especially the older generations. They
often question the usability and effectiveness of various technologies. Gelb and Diofasi (2016)
present a pertinent reflection of the criticism:
…Using sophisticated technology does not necessarily increase the credibility or
the fairness of elections…Biometrics can only address certain types of electoral
fraud so that their potential contribution to cleaner elections depends on whether
the most egregious threats to electoral integrity coincide with these categories
(pp.1-2).
Some observers also raise questions regarding the long-term sustainability of the ICT revolution
in elections (Evrensel, 2010). They contend that some technologies or digital machines, over the
years, might become “dated” (unusable), as ICTs are constantly evolving. This might cause a
constant drain of precious resources to update these technologies or purchase new ones, and to
train electoral personnel to run those machines.
Existing scholarship, however, is noticeably reticent about the kinds of technology that
augment electoral integrity. Nor does the scholarship differentiate the efficiency of different forms
of ICTs employed at different stages of the electoral cycle. This inadequacy of existing research is
exacerbated by the technicality of different ICTs, as EMBs across the globe, tend to use different
types of ICTs in electoral management. This is also a problem when trying to identify the suitable
9

forms of ICTs that yield more productive results than others to uphold and increase electoral
integrity and are worthy of more investment by EMBs.
Research Question
The literature review above suggests that introducing digital technologies into the electoral
process does not offer an easy fix. The effectiveness of digital technologies tends to be highly
nuanced. The success of technologies does not work linearly because the effectiveness is
contingent on a variety of local and national factors. Moreover, the deployment of digital
technology might also invite new security problems and vulnerabilities such as software
manipulation and hacking.
Cheeseman and his colleagues (2018) argue that oftentimes digitization takes place due to
a “rent-seeking” behavior of several influential actors. Critics contend that complete digitization
of elections is too difficult to achieve because digital technologies cannot prevent voter
intimidation, gerrymandering, and political persecution (Cheeseman et al. 2018). Yet, there is a
lack of systemic effort to explore the impact of digitalization on the perception of electoral
integrity. This dissertation is conceived to partially fill the void and investigates whether or not the
use of ICTs in the election administration affects the perception of electoral integrity. To further
address these debates regarding the application of digital technologies in elections, this dissertation
tests the following main hypothesis:
H1: Countries using digital technologies in elections are more likely to have higher levels
of electoral integrity.

10

Methodology
This study mainly employs multilevel mixed-effects ordered logistic models for each set
of independent variables, depending on the applications of digital technologies at different stages
of an electoral cycle. Multilevel models are suitable to infer relationships where data involves more
than one level of analysis. The use of ordered regression models is quite common in educational
science, psychology, and social science (Bauer and Sterba, 2011; O’Connell, 2010), where
response variable(s) are obtained through a natural hierarchy of an ordinal scale (e.g. “Strongly
Agree”, “Somewhat agree,” etc.).
There is growing recognition that the application of a linear model, particularly in
hierarchically clustered observations, is inadequate to explain nested data because “…classical
statistical models like analysis of variance and linear regression assume independence” (Bauer and
Sterba, 2011, p.1). A growing body of literature discusses the significance of this estimation
procedure in dealing with ordered and hierarchically nested data (Goldstein, 2011; Johnson, 2010;
Hedeker, 2003). For instance, Hedeker points out that the multilevel model allows “…flexibility
in the choice of contrasts used to represent comparisons across the response categories” (2003, p.
1433). Multilevel models, alternatively known as hierarchical, mixed-effects, and nested models,
are an extension of traditional regression models that “….account for the structuring of data across
aggregate groupings, that is, they explicitly account for the nested nature of data across multiple
levels of analysis” (Johnson, 2010, p. 4).
In this study, the use of this empirical strategy is determined by two factors. First, experts’
responses on the perception of electoral integrity, the dependent variable of this study, are
estimated on an ordinal scale of 1-10. Second, experts’ overall rating of electoral integrity
comprises both country contexts and election types. While rating electoral integrity, experts look
11

at countries’ overall structural factors and the time and contexts of elections, which necessitates
more than one level of analysis. Most recently, Frank and Coma (2017) used the same dependent
variable and employed a mixed-effects, multiple-level ordered logistics model to estimate the
effects of various election dynamics on the perception of electoral integrity.
While I build on these studies to design my research, as a process of robustness checking,
I also use alternative estimation such as Ordinary Least Squares (OLS), Ordered Logistics, and
Ordered Probit models. I then compare the coefficients, particularly marginal effects, of each of
the models to compare the differences of estimation. These alternative empirical specifications are
useful to compare the validity of the selected models, thereby increasing the robustness of the
findings of this study.
Data Sources
To test the hypothesis, most of the exogenous variables about the various usages of ICT
are extracted from International IDEA’s ICTs in Elections, which provides a comparative overview
of the global patterns and usage of ICTs in various stages of the electoral cycle (International
IDEA). 3 The dependent variable, rating of electoral integrity, is extracted from the Perception of
Electoral Integrity (PEI) dataset. The IDEA database is built from a survey covering five key areas
in which ICTs are employed: (1) voter registration and identification; (2) e-voting; (3) processing
of results; (4) use of open source technology in election administration; and (5) online data
publication by electoral management bodies (EMBs). After a careful review of the dataset, only
six variables – biometric in voter registration, biometric identification at polling stations, electronic
tabulation of results online voter registration, technologies at polling stations, and poll registration

3

International IDEA, ICTs in Election Database (https://www.idea.int/data-tools/data/icts-elections).
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publication – have been sorted for final analyses. The dataset is still evolving, and information
about some variables is either missing or statistically inadequate for regression analyses. To assess
the key hypotheses, I conducted a series of regression tests using these independent variables. Most
of the independent variables are binary indicators.
The Rationale of the Study
This research project makes several scholarly contributions. First, it provides results of
empirical analyses regarding the ongoing debate about whether the application of digital
technologies improves electoral integrity. This is done by exploiting two unique datasets related
to ICTs in elections and the perception of electoral integrity. While a burgeoning literature captures
various dynamics that shape the perception of election integrity as well as dwell on some of the
unintended consequences of digital technologies, most of these findings are based on case studies.
This project assesses the relevance of these claims and counterclaims by exploring empirical
evidence of ICT-electoral integrity relationships.
Second, the study has significant policy implications, particularly in identifying the most
effective application of digital technologies. By using separate estimations for a variety of digital
deployments in all phases of elections (pre-election to post-election levels), the study makes a
significant policy contribution to ascertain the best pay-off of investment in the digitization of the
electoral process. Because EMBs around the world spend millions of dollars in acquiring these
technologies, these findings will help policymakers to develop practical insights into prioritizing
which digitization tools require more attention and are worthy of investment.

13

Chapter 2: ICTs and Electoral Integrity: A Literature Review

As elections have become the foundation in the peaceful transition of power in multiparty
democracies, understanding electoral integrity has been a spirited research agenda in comparative
politics and electoral studies. Over the decade, a burgeoning body of research (Alvarez, et al.,
2008; Birch, 2010; 2011; Kelley, 2012; Norris, 2012; 2013a; 2014; 2015; Norris et al., 2014;
Norris et al. eds., 2014; Van Ham, 2015; Frank & Coma, 2017; Coma, & Trinh, 2017) examined
why and how elections fail and what constitutes the fairness of the electoral processes. Conducting
elections is a complicated process, and, in recent years, elections in both emerging and established
democracies have been plagued by malpractice, gerrymandering, fraud, and widespread
allegations of manipulations.
Amid the swelling trend of a global social media-based disinformation campaign, the 2016
presidential election in the United States triggered debates for improving the efficiency of electoral
management and citizens’ trust (Van Ham & Garnett, 2019). Elections in Britain, Ireland (Buckley
& Reidy, 2015; Clark, 2015; Farrell, 2015), South America, Africa, and South Asia raised
questions because of irregularities (Van Ham & Garnett, 2019; Kerr, 2014; Otaola, 2017). As such,
citizens’ perception of electoral integrity is increasingly being scrutinized as a critical element of
modern democracies (Birch & Van Ham, 2017).
While elections at times seem to be free and supposedly competitive (McAllister & White,
2015) in diverse socio-cultural and political settings, perception of “fairness” and credibility is
highly nuanced (Norris, 2013b). Electoral malpractice stems from a variety of sources including
but not limited to violations of human rights (Norris, Frank, & i Coma, 2014; Levitsky & Way
2010; Simpser, 2013), undue influence by incumbent elites to manipulate the outcomes
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(McAllister & White, 2015), discriminatory electoral laws (Hall, 2013) and restrictions of voting
rights (Hasen, 2012; Minnite, 2010; Wang 2012), and flawed voter registration and identification
(Norris, 2014). Elections experts and scholars from both political science and public administration
have examined the forensics of these irregularities in elections as well as assessed the detrimental
consequences of flawed or failed elections. In Why Electoral Integrity Matters (2014), Norris
contends that electoral flaws and mismanagement – such as ballot stuffing, pro-incumbency bias,
discriminatory electoral practices, and erroneous voter lists – erode citizens’ trust and undermine
the legitimacy of states and their institutions.
Other studies suggest that poor integrity of elections undermines voters’ confidence in the
electoral process (Claassen et al., 2013). Since elections are perceived to be the legitimate
democratic means to resolve political conflicts, a growing volume of research indicates that
electoral malpractice might cause electoral disputes and political unrest and, as such, threaten the
consolidation of democracies in developing countries (Elklit & Reynolds, 2002; James, 2019). In
Electoral Conflict and Violence, Fischer contends,
An electoral process is an alternative to violence as it is a means of achieving
governance. It is when an electoral process is perceived as unfair, unresponsive, or
corrupt, that its political legitimacy is compromised and stakeholders are motivated
to go outside the established norms to achieve their objectives. Electoral conflict
and violence become tactics in political competition (2002, p. 2).
To address these mounting challenges in emerging democracies, it has become increasingly
common to send electoral assistance (Birch & Muchlinski, 2018), electoral observer missions, and
establish an independent and impartial Election Commissions. Existing research, however,
indicates mixed evidence as to what extent these mechanisms and normative measures ensure the
15

quality of elections. Also, questions remain whether international observers can judge the quality
of elections because of their divergent assessment criteria. As Norris et al. contend, many election
observers’ divergent assessments are “…far from universal, and it remains difficult to compare
reports consistently across countries worldwide” (2014, p. 790). While impartial and independent
EMB is viewed as an effective institutional model to check electoral irregularities, comparative
assessments of these bodies across the globe also provide inconsistent evidence (Van Ham &
Garnett, 2019; Birch and Van Ham, 2017). In some fragile and transitional democracies, EMB’s
impartiality is challenged due to insidious electoral laws, which enhance opportunities for partisan
political elites to exert pressure on the electoral administrators and curb their legal and financial
independence (Birch & Van Ham, 2017).
As such, there has been rapid growth in research to understand and assess the key
determinants of electoral integrity. This chapter revisits the concept of electoral integrity and
reviews the existing debates regarding the parameters of electoral integrity. The subsequent
sections, I discuss the digitization of the electoral process and assess some theoretical assumptions
about digital democracy. I also discuss the acceptance of technology in the electoral process.
The Concept of Electoral Integrity
Evaluating the quality of elections is a complex process since irregularities can arise at
different stages of the electoral cycle involving pre-election voter registration and identification,
election day ballot stuffing and intimidation, to post-election vote counting and publication of the
results (Coma & Van Ham, 2015; Elklit & Reynolds 2005). Moreover, electoral administrations
across the world follow different standards on how to conduct elections, which make it difficult to
assess the quality of these elections. As such, scholars in comparative politics use various
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methodological parameters to measure the integrity of elections involving the organizational,
institutional, and structural determinants of elections.
Despite the rapid growth of electoral integrity literature and various databases, a
universally accepted definition of electoral integrity is still non-existent. Integrity is an inviolable
quality or aspiration of fairness that does not diminish due to undue exercise of power and
influence by vested quarters. The idea of integrity is strongly founded on moral principles and
global norms, and thus, comes with the attached meaning of sacredness. Integrity refers to
“incorruptibility or a firm adherence to a code of moral values” (Global Commission on Elections,
Democracy and Security, 2012, p. 12). For example, limiting political rights to vote to certain
groups of people within a country is a sheer violation of electoral integrity. The lexical meaning
of the term integrity refers to the quality of being honest and having strong moral principles. When
it comes to the questions of electoral integrity, it generally refers to the perceived quality or
credibility of elections that preserve the sacredness of voting and uphold the moral principles and
provisions that guide these elections. Electoral integrity is broadly conceived as adherence to
global norms and values to conduct elections at different stages of the electoral cycle. The Kofi
Annan Foundation defines electoral integrity as
Any election that is based on the democratic principles of universal suffrage and
political equality as reflected in international standards and agreements, and is
professional, impartial, and transparent in its preparation and administration
throughout the electoral cycle 4” (Kofi Annan Foundation, 2012 cited in ACE, p.
n.d.).

4

Electoral integrity. Retrieved from https://aceproject.org/ace-en/topics/ei/explore_topic_new
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As such, there is a growing trend of using a normative and obligation-based arguments in assessing
the quality of elections. The Electoral Integrity Project (EIP), an academic research project based
at Harvard and Sydney Universities, and the Carter Center are at the forefront of advocacy of this
normative argument. According to EIP, electoral integrity refers to
…International standards and global norms governing the appropriate conduct of
elections” These standards have been endorsed in a series of authoritative
conventions, treaties, protocols, and guidelines by agencies of the international
community, notably by the decisions of the United Nations (UN) General
Assembly, by regional bodies such as the OSCE, the Organization of American
States, and the African Union, and by member states in the UN (Norris, et al., 2014,
p. 790; see also Carroll and Davis-Roberts, 2013).
The perceived integrity of elections is hard to measure as challenges may stem from the various
stages of the electoral cycle. If candidates and electorates perceive elections are fraudulent, they
might not view the outcome as representative of their mandate and thereby might dispute the
outcome. Experts observe that an obligation-based approach is useful to withstand these
challenges. Carroll and Davis-Roberts (2013) contend, the “obligations-based approach to election
assessment provides a promising avenue for fostering consensus on the elements of democratic
elections, as well as the assessment criteria used by observer groups” (p.87). These obligations are
applied to each component of the electoral cycle (Figure 1). There are methodical standards to
measure electoral integrity. As such, operationalization of “electoral integrity” is difficult. This
dissertation, however, uses the PEI database to analyze data on electoral integrity. The PEI
database is useful because of its clarity about the concept, electoral integrity, and inclusivity of its
measurement. PEI’s expert-based surveys currently use 49 indicators in 11 major categories
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reflecting the whole electoral cycle. Figure 1 presents these essential components of elections.
Each year, the Electoral Integrity Project (EIP) publishes the global PEI Index by summing up the
49 indicators for elections. Selected election experts for each country respond to the questions
under each category and rate the overall integrity of elections.
Figure 1: Electoral Cycle used by PEI Database
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Source: Figure adopted from Norris et al., 2014.
Digitization of Electoral Processes: Revising the Existing Theories
The digitization of the electoral processes and the diffusion of ICTs at all stages of the
electoral cycle has been accelerated by a broader awareness of “going digital” and “reinventing
government” (Dawes, 2008; NPR, 1993) in the information age. In the early 1990s, many Western
countries, including the U.S., started a governance reform campaign to transform bureaucratic
work processes by focusing on the needs of customers rather than the needs of the traditional
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structures of agencies (Dawes, 2008; Gore, 1993). In 1999, the National Science Foundation (NSF)
first coined the term “digital government” to denote better government services through ICT
innovation (Dawes, 2008). As many countries embrace “electronic government” or “egovernance” – defined as the creative use of ICTs to facilitate public services, citizen engagement
in the democratic process, and enhancing high-quality and cost-effective government
administrations – there has been a growing call for election administrations across the globe to
adopt and leverage ICTs to modernize the electoral processes, enhance transparency, and improve
voting experiences.
While the slogan “better government for less” has been the benchmark of e-governance as
ICTs reduce the transactional costs of public services and thereby maximize utility, the questions
of why or when organizations and citizens adopt or accept ICTs remains substantially unanswered.
The digitization of ICTs in elections is embedded in the social and organizational contexts of each
country, and there are both supply and demand factors that cause the adoption of technology.
Scholars from political science, information science, public administration, and business have
offered a cluster of theoretical lenses to explain the phenomena. This section revisits some notable
theories to comprehend the use of ICTs in election administration.
Technology Acceptance Model (TAM)
Technology Acceptance Model (TAM) is one of the most widely used theoretical
frameworks to explain user acceptance of ICTs on the demand side. Davis (1989) first came up
with this theory and borrowed psychological “theory of reasoned action” (TRA) to predict
behaviors based on “attitudes” and “subjective norms” (Gupta et al., 2016). TAM predicts the
citizens’ use and acceptance of ICTs based on two key constructs – “perceived usefulness” and
“perceived ease of use.” “Perceived usefulness” refers to “…the degree to which a person believes
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that using a particular system would enhance his or her job performance” (Davis, 1989, p. 320).
“Perceived ease of use” is defined as "the degree to which a person believes that using a particular
system would be free of efforts” (Davis, 1989. p.320). TAM theory predicts that both the
“usefulness” and the “ease of use” (with less effort) significantly shapes citizens’ attitudes about
the adoption of ICTs. These intentions are also accelerated by “subjective norms” (push from the
social environment).
Today, digital technology has permeated every level of our society, and the Internet,
emails, apps, and mobile devices have become ubiquitous forms of communication. Because of
this new frontier of communication in the networked society and the deep penetration of IT
infrastructure, there have been growing demands from voters to digitize the electoral process.
Diffusion of Innovation (DOI) Theory
Diffusion theory also provides significant clues to explain the social and organization
acceptance of ICTs in elections. According to Rogers (1962, 2003), who developed the theory,
diffusion is “the process by which an innovation is communicated through certain channels over
time among the members of a social system” (2003, p. 35). An innovation is “idea, practice, or
object that is perceived as new by an individual or other unit of adoption” (Rogers, 2003, p. 12).
DOI theory states that there are five components of innovation: “relative advantage,”
“compatibility,” “complexity,” “trialability,” and “observability” (Rogers, 2003). Rogers (2003)
asserts that individual and social acceptance of ICTs is determined by the relative advantage –
benefits outweigh the costs of ICT adoption. Venkatesh and colleagues (2003) also proposed a
Unified Theory of Acceptance and Use of Technology (UTAUT) by combining existing ICT and
innovation theories. UTAUT relies on four key components: “effort expectancy,” “performance
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expectancy,” “social influence,” and “facilitating conditions” (see, Gupta et al., 2016). The
following table summarizes the key theoretical constructs of these models:
A group of scholars (King et al., 1994) examined organizational roles to facilitate the
adoption of e-governance. Why and when do organizations adopt ICTs and what are the factors
that play out in this adoption? The availability of ICT innovations and social pressures to enhance
performance and services push organizations to adapt to reality. Scholars proposed an institutional
perspective to explain these organizational behaviors in adopting ICTs.
Institutional Intervention Theory
Organizations are living organisms and constantly strive and evolve to survive and adapt
to new social and political realities. Scott defines institutions as social entities that are highly
resilient (cited in Shi et al., 2008). The institutional theory asserts that beliefs, attitudes, and
behaviors are significantly shaped by networks of groups and organizations, and changes in policy
choices occur due to constant drive for legitimacy (Shi et al, 2008). According to King et al.,
Institutional intervention in IT innovation can be constructed at the intersection of
the influence and regulatory powers of institutions and the ideologies of supplypush and demand-pull models of innovation (1994, p. 139).
The demand push is generated by the growing expectancy of transparency, efficiency, and
performance from public and private organizations. The supply push, on the other hand, is driven
by the level of IT infrastructure in the society, the resultant ICT innovations, and the applications
of ICT communication by other public organizations. As organizations compete for resources, they
become susceptible to these pressures to adopt regulatory preferences. Research indicates that the

22

regulation of organizations is shaped by three types of pressures: coercive, normative, and mimetic
(Scott, 2001).
Coercive pressures refer to the influence of a resource-rich organization and other social
actors over a resource-dependent organization to adopt the prescribed attitudes, behaviors, and
practices of governance (Scott, 2001). The regulatory policy and electoral laws, in many
developing countries, are shaped by not only their domestic constituents but also their bilateral and
international donors.
At the institutional level, the organizational culture within a country may also create a
normative pressure to adapt to the changing reality (Scott, 2001). External factors such as the
degree of diffusion of ICTs – the telecommunication network, national IT infrastructure,
availability and affordability of digitized communications, human capital, organizational
capability, and perceived utility of these innovations – may create a normative pressure on the
organization. Although organizations’ responses to this kind of pressure depend on the context,
resource availability, and characteristics of public administration, in some cases, organizations
may voluntarily update work procedures and embrace ICTs to deliver better public services. The
incentive, in this case, is to stay relevant to the changing time and service expectations of their
stakeholders. Table 1 summarizes the theoretical constructs of all the models discussed above.
Table 1: Models of Technology Acceptance
Model

TAM

Constructs

Definitions

Theorists

Perceived
usefulness

“…A person believes that using a particular
system would enhance his or her job
performance.”

Perceived ease
of use

“…A person believes that using a particular
system would be free of effort.”

Davis (1989,
p. 320)
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DOI

Relative
advantage

The perceived relative advantage of an
innovation. The greater the relative advantage,
the greater the rate of adoption (p.15)

Compatibility

Perceived compatibility of innovation with
existing social values, beliefs, and experiences
of the adopters (p.15).

Complexity

“…Innovation is perceived as relatively difficult
to understand and use” (p. 257).

Trialability

Innovation is experimented with on a limited
basis (p.16).

Observability

“…Results of an innovation are visible to
others” (p. 258)

UTAUT Performance
Expectancy

Rogers
(2003)

“Degree to which an individual believes that
using the system will help him or her to attain
gains in job performance” (p. 447).

Effort
Expectancy

“Degree of ease associated with the use of the
system.” (p. 450).

Social
Influence

“Degree to which an individual perceives that
important others believe he or she should use the
new system” (p. 451).

Facilitating
conditions

“Degree to which an individual believes that an
organizational and technical infrastructure exists
to support the use of the system” (p. 453).

Venkatesh et
al., (2003)

Table adapted from Venkatesh et al., (2003) and Gupta et al., 2016.
EMB’s successes in some powerful countries in conducting elections through ICTs inspire
EMBs in other countries. For instance, India’s success in using Electronic Voting Machines
(EVM) has encouraged Bangladesh to use these machines in local and national elections.
Dawes (2008) studies the evolution of e-governance and sheds light on a range of factors
for the adoption of ICTs in public administration. In some cases, a broad policy reform to embrace
ICTs is driven by network and service expansion, empowerment of citizens through greater access
to information, and management innovations. Moreover, some issues that also factor into egovernance adoption are (Dawes, 2008 enhanced public services to provide access, convenience,
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and choices to people; high quality and cost-effective government operations through technical
improvement, information management, and infrastructure investment; and increased engagement
in the democratic process through e-participation, greater accessibility and usability of digital
technologies, and information content management. Finally, this review of existing theories is not
exhaustive; however, these assumptions provide a commonsense perspective to understand the
application of ICTs in electoral administration. The subsequent section sheds light on how the uses
of ICTs is perceived to enhance the quality of elections.
ICTs and Electoral Integrity: The Linkages
Today, digitization of electoral processes has become a new normal phenomenon across
the globe. While there are gaps between developed and developing countries in terms of the
sophistication of digitization processes, application of ICTs is prevalent at all stages of the electoral
cycle. International IDEA estimates that only 11% of countries conduct elections without the
application of ICTs (Wolf, 2017a). From the lever-operated voting machines in the 1890s to the
punch card voting system in the 1960s (Card & Moretti, 2007), technologies have always been a
part of elections, although these technologies have evolved over the decades. Modern-day
elections are no exception. ICTs – biometric machines for voter registration and identification,
electronic voting or internet voting, and electronic tabulations for publications of results abound
across the globe.
Why do Electoral Management Bodies use ICTs to conduct elections, and how do these
ICT innovations contribute to electoral integrity? System assessments of the questions remain
inadequate; however, research on ICTs’ transparency and e-government (Bertot et al., 2010; Shim
& Eom, 2008; Relly & Sabharwal, 2009; Von Haldenwang, 2004) indicates that ICTs act as
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alternative tools to curb corruption and thereby enhance transparency. Bertot et al. contend that
ICT-based initiative,
…Reduce corruption by promoting good governance, strengthening reformoriented initiatives, reducing potential for corrupt behaviors, enhancing
relationships between government employees and citizens, allowing for citizen
tracking of activities, and by monitoring and controlling behaviors of government
employees (2010, p. 265).
Von Haldenwang (2004) suggests that many governments opt to use ICTs to promote efficiency
and transparency. Shim and Eom’s (2008) empirical assessment indicates that the use of ICTs
boosts internal and managerial control over corrupt behaviors due to the enhanced ability to
promote accountability within the government. International IDEA (2015) also posits that
technology streamlines electoral processes by reducing the reliance on humans in conducting
elections. Electoral malpractice tends to be high where there are low risks of detection of fraud
and higher opportunity for benefits. ICTs have the potential to curtail these opportunities by
bringing greater openness and visibility of electoral misconduct, and by reducing unnecessary
human intervention in government work (Shim & Eom, 2009). Norris (2004) assesses the benefits
of electronic voting and finds that it potentially increases the efficiency, speed, and accuracy of
elections by reducing the “information costs” of participation.
Other streams of research – ICTs and participation – examine how ICTs boost civic
engagement and increase democratic participation in elections, especially among young people.
Diamond (2010) contends that technology facilitates democratic engagement, while Alvarez et al.
(2012) assert that ICTs augment citizens’ participation in elections by making the voting process
easier and more convenient. Existing research suggests higher electoral costs of participation keep
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some citizens from not showing up at the polls, whereas remote electronic voting choices provide
an alternative avenue to offset these costs and encourage voting participation (Norris, 2004).
Extant research on ICTs vividly displays a “cyber-optimistic” view because the Internet and new
communication tools transform voting procedures by attracting new voters and enhancing the
legitimacy of democratic institutions like election administration (Bochsler, 2010; Trechsel, 2007;
Norris, 2001).
As ICTs arguably simplify the time-consuming voting process (Bochsler, 2010), new
communication tools have the potential to increase voter participation in elections. Other research
reinforces these hypotheses by indicating that accessibility and convenience tend to have a
significant impact on voter turnout (Carter & Bélanger, 2012; Dyck & Gimpel, 2005). Decreasing
rates of citizens’ political participation has been one of the compelling reasons that propagate a
range of e-government initiatives in the West including electoral reforms. Easy access to the ballot
through I-voting or Internet voting – secured transmission of the ballot through the Internet – is
increasingly being viewed as one of the timely ICT innovations to increase democratic
participation (Carter & Bélanger, 2012). Other studies shed light on the cost-benefit analysis of
ICTs in electoral processes and contend that ICT-based elections reduce operational costs and
streamline vote-counting procedures and presentation of results (Kersting & Baldersheim, 2004).
Digitization of the Electoral Processes: Current Debates
The adoption and progress of ICTs in electoral processes have been marked by promises
and pitfalls (Card, D., & Moretti, 2007). While the application of ICTs is increasingly prevalent in
electoral management and democratic processes (van der Staak & Wolf, 2019), not all electoral
bodies have reaped equal benefits from the digitization of elections. Electoral bodies in some
countries in Europe have been fighting an uphill battle to use ICT instruments in elections. In 2006,
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the Netherlands abandoned the electronic voting process and returned to manual voting because
the security risks of the computer systems became widely evident (van der Staak & Wolf, 2019;
Balzarotti et al., 2009). In addition to hacking attacks and vulnerabilities of ICTs, these new
communication technologies can become an easy target of political disinformation campaigns
through the spread of rumors and falsehoods that these systems are fragile and can manipulate
votes (van der Staak & Wolf, 2019).
The application of ICTs in electoral management has always been a matter of contention
between techno-optimists and techno-skeptics. The rift is due to divergent perceptions around four
major issues: a) the potential cost-benefits of digitization of the electoral process; b) convenience
vs. hacking and new unintended vulnerabilities; c) sustainability of these new technologies; and d)
disinformation and citizens’ trust and confidence about the integrity of these technologies.
These debates over the digitization of the electoral process are not new. In the past, cyber
skeptics across the globe sued EMBs and staged political processions to protest the adoption of
ICTs in the electoral process. In the United States, for instance, electoral authorities faced lawsuits
because of the deployment of DREs, as these machines did not provide an alternative “paper trail”
to verify the final vote counting process (Card & Moretti, 2007). In recent years, there has been a
growing demand, as a part electoral reform, for a nonpartial third party verification of computing
voting technologies and a secure “paper trail” on all votes cast (Manpearl, 2018; Rivest & Stark,
2017). search provides a detailed analysis of these debates. Studies dwell on biometric registration
and identification (Debrah, 2018; Yakubu & Adjei, 2014; Tilwani et al., 2013; Gold, 2012),
Internet voting (Warkentin et al., 2018; Stockemer, 2018), touch-screen voting (Card & Moretti,
2007), and electronic tabulation (Pesado et al., 2016; Conway et al., 2017) and electronic voting
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(Wang et al., 2018; Simpson & Storer, 2017; García, 2015; Krimmer, 2012; Lee et al., 2010;
Khasawneh et al., 2008; Riera & Brown; 2003).
Existing scholarship is noticeably reticent about the kinds of technology that are more
effective in increasing the integrity of elections. Also, previous research simply has not examined
the details of what works in what circumstances. Nor does the scholarship differentiate the
efficiency of different forms of ICTs employed at different stages of the electoral cycle. This
inadequacy of existing research is exacerbated by the technicality of different ICTs, as EMBs
across the globe tend to use different types of ICTs in electoral management. This inadequacy is a
problem to identify the suitable forms and types of ICTs that yield more productive results than
others to uphold and increase electoral integrity and are worthy of more investment by EMBs. .
Some ICT innovations have the potential capability to bring a profound change in our
traditional way of doing business. These technologies, at times, are called “disruptive
technologies” (Adner, 2002; Oram, 2001) to signify their enormous capability to radically alter the
contexts in which they operate. In Digitally Enable Social Change (2011), Jennifer Earl and
Katrina Kimport coin the phrase “scale change” to denote the higher speed and lower costs of
digital technologies in altering the reality of the contexts. Technological affordance – artifacts (e.g.
smartphones) that can afford people to do certain things –is not enough to change the contexts, as
it counts on the actions of the users. Over the last two decades, two types of arguments significantly
shaped the interpretation of how ICT innovations will affect the contexts. Because of contradictory
views, a continuum perspective is useful to discuss these divergent thinking about ICTs. Figure 2
presents a continuum perspective of ICTs potential.
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Figure 2: A Continuum Perspective of ICTs Potential
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Cyber optimists embrace ICT innovations, as they believe digitization will bring progress
to transform the future for good. This school of thought displays a positive view of these
innovations. They believe that ICTs empower users and act as enablers to improve service and
efficiency of organizations. Cyber pessimists, on the other hand, are skeptical about the progress
and fear bad consequences of ICT innovations. They suspect that rapid digitization will
disempower people due to enhanced surveillance by governments, hackings, and manipulations of
these technologies. There are contextual nuances in divergent perceptions regarding the use of
ICTs in elections. In some places, the intensity of these debates is more ostensible than others.
Why do citizens in some countries tend to be more concerned about the use of ICTs in elections
than others? The answers may lie in a range of factors such as national usability and penetration
of ICTs (citizens’ exposures), experiences, the integrity of the IT infrastructure, political context,
and trust. The organization's culture, socio-political contexts, and citizens’ trust in institutions at
times influence these debates. Digitization of electoral processes requires a change of existing
electoral laws, training of electoral staff, and investment in IT infrastructure. These legal and
financial constraints, the independence and credibility of EMBs, and trust between the ruling and
opposition elites significantly shape the digitization of the electoral process. Also, public trust and
political parties’ acceptance of these technologies, transparency of decisions to go digital, and the
timeframe in which decisions are made come into play regarding the introduction of new ICTs.
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ICTs in Elections: The Hopes
Cyber optimists as the proponents of ICTs in elections believe that digitization enriches
the voting experience due to enhanced power to detect fraud and manipulation in voter registration
and identification. They tend to believe that ICTs facilitate civic participation in digital democracy
as technology brings convenience to voting and communicates opinions across the political
spectrum. Optimists also believe that digitized voter lists, electronic voting machines, fingerprint
technology to verify voters’ identities reduces time and costs, and reliance on humans to conduct
elections, thus, has the potential to increase voters’ trust in elections. These assertations are
reinforced by Stockemer’s (2018) finding that Internet penetration positively affects electoral
integrity. Elections fail (Norris, 2004) because of multiple registrations, falsification and
impersonation, multiple voting, ballot-box stuffing, vote-buying, and manipulation of vote
counting. Optimists believe that biometric registration, e-voting, and EVMs reduce these electoral
malpractices. Electoral management in populous countries like India and Bangladesh find these
technologies as cost-effective solutions to optimize resources and increase the transparency of the
voting experience on election day.
Elections are complex administrative processes that require the mobilization of vast
resources, electoral logistics, and security personnel across the country. The traditional way of
“paper-based” voting, according to optimists, is fraught with many security dangers. Oftentimes,
polling stations are vandalized, paper ballots are stolen, and electoral staff are killed by miscreants.
Moreover, transparency and trustworthiness remain significant problems in paper-based systems
due to the lack of auditable verification mechanisms for electoral stakeholders and citizens. Fragile
democracies often suffer from bureaucratic corruption and institutional weaknesses (Cohen, 2008).
Because of high stakes for winning (access to resources and power), incumbents and their
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unscrupulous political clientele might threaten electoral staff and polling center managers to
manipulate voting results (Callen et al. 2015). Recent scholarship indicates that electoral violence
reduces voter turnout (Collier & Vicente, 2014; García, 2009). Kuhn’s (2013) study of SubSaharan African countries finds that citizens’ fear of violence and victimization during election
campaigns are less likely to vote in elections. Trelles and Carreras (2012) examine criminal
violence in Mexico. Their findings suggest that drug-related criminal violence negatively affects
voter turnout.
ICT proponents believe that technology (e.g. digital ballots, electronic voting, EVMs,
fingerprint technology, etc.) can bring some hope for preventing violence and irregularities by
providing an alternative way to vote. Existing research (Callen et al., 2015; Bertot et al., 2010;
Khasawneh et al., 2008) contends that ICTs can augment the integrity of elections by reducing
frauds and inaccuracy in voter registration and authentication processes. Debnath et al. (2017)
investigate the impact of EVMs in India and find that, in politically sensitive states, the use of
EVMs reduces electoral frauds. Additionally, EMBs in developing countries view technology as
the “…cost-effective and convenient means to promote openness and transparency and to reduce
corruption.” (Bertot et al., 2010, p. 264).
Digital Elections: The Hype
Cyber skeptics view elections as a straightforward process: show up at the poll, cast votes
in a sealed ballot box, count the votes, and publish the results. They fear the digitized electoral
process invites new vulnerabilities such as hacking and manipulations by the algorithm. Cyber
pessimists fear that computerized voting procedures reduce electoral credibility because these
technologies are not necessarily equipped with third party verification mechanisms. They often
raise the issue of digital literacy and argue that these advanced voting technologies might alienate
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some groups of voters, especially the older generations. They often question the usability and
effectiveness of various technologies. Gelb and Diofasi present a very pertinent reflection of the
criticism:
…Using sophisticated technology does not necessarily increase the credibility or
the fairness of elections…Biometrics can only address certain types of electoral
fraud so that their potential contribution to cleaner elections depends on whether
the most egregious threats to electoral integrity coincide with these categories
(2016, pp. 1-2).
Lack of trust and low confidence in ICTs are prevalent in both developing and developed countries.
Alvarez et al. (2008) explore voters’ satisfaction with ICTs in two presidential elections in 2000
and 2004 and find that the use of technology negatively affects voters’ confidence in elections.
Their findings indicate that most of the respondents are skeptical about whether their votes would
ultimately be recorded and counted. This skepticism is exacerbated by their partisan political
identity, race, and level of education. Piccolino’s (2016) comparative analysis of the voter
registration process in Côte d’Ivoire and Ghana reveals contrasting evidence. He finds that Côte
d’Ivoire’s voter registration process remains questionable due to the politicization of a citizenship
question, whereas in Ghana a credible voter registration process remains a major component of
democratic consolidation. Cheeseman et al., in “Digital Dilemmas: The Unintended Consequences
of Election Technology” (2018), provide a comprehensive review of most of the concerns related
to ICTs in elections. They contend that technology, without a rigorous assessment of effectiveness,
“may create significant opportunities for corruption that (among other things) … the failure of
digital checks and balances often renders an electoral process even more vulnerable to rigging than
it was before” (Cheeseman et al., 2018, p. 1397)
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Cyber skeptics often claim that digital technology can take power away from many (Yard
ed., 2010) because these technologies are not equipped with an independent verifiable mechanism.
The “black box” approach used in most of the ICT technologies decreases the electorates’ control
and leaves little room for observation (Cheeseman et al., 2018; Evrensel, 2010). As only electoral
staff or poll managers can inspect the functioning of these machines, these claims are not
unfounded. For instance, Evrensel (2010) notes, in Mozambique, EMB refused to disclose the
details of the computer process used in voter registration. Moreover, ICTs in elections are run
through a sophisticated process and thus are susceptible to breaking on election day. For example,
in a recent parliamentary by-election in Bangladesh, there were numerous allegations that EVMs
failed to verify voters’ identification due to either faulty machines or technical discrepancies.
Techno pessimists are also concerned that EVMs have no paper audit trail. For instance, a member
of a technical committee formed by Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) recently argued, “If they
kept the paper audit trail, then we could at least challenge the results based on that, and ask for
matching of records” (Dhaka Tribune, 2020, p. n.d.).
Some observers also raise questions regarding the long-term sustainability of the ICT
revolution in elections (Evrensel, 2010). They contend that some technologies or digital machines,
over the years, might become “dated” (unusable), as ICTs are constantly evolving. This might
cause a constant drain of precious resources to update these technologies or purchase new ones,
and to train electoral personnel to run those machines. Evrensel’s (2010) comparative study on
voter registration in Africa, particularly concerning the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC),
finds that the introduction of high-tech ICTs creates a dangerous trap. Once the equipment or
digital machines are bought, there is a sense that they must be used despite high costs involving
upkeep and updates of these technologies.
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The Cyber Pragmatists’ Perspective
A review of the controversies and claims and counterclaims by cyber optimists and
pessimists makes a cyber pragmatist perspective even more relevant. Perhaps, the truth lies
somewhere in between hope and hype regarding the use of digital technology. ICTs are mere tools;
they offer new solutions but bring unintended consequences. ICTs facilitate new alternative
avenues to think about electoral irregularities, yet they are susceptible to hacking and software
manipulations. ICTs have the potential to significantly shape the contexts in which these
technologies operate, but the success of ICTs in elections is also shaped by socio-political and
structural factors of the contexts. ICTs cannot solve political disputes and the problems of trust
between parties. ICTs improve efficiency, but their success, to a great extent, is tied to the contexts.
The introduction of ICTs has been successful in some countries and some elections, but this does
not imply other countries will reap the same benefits. Every political context and election are
unique. Therefore, the successful use of ICTs in elections relies on a greater understanding of the
subjective contexts and socio-political structural contexts of the country. This section reviews
some thorny issues that often shape the success of ICTs.
Public Trust and Confidence in ICTs in Elections
Citizens’ trust remains critically tied to the success of ICTs and electoral integrity. Do
people trust the technologies they use in elections? What is the level of people’s trust in their
political institutions? Are those technologies rigorously vetted? Do EMBs have the technical
capacity and will to maintain the smooth operation of these technologies? These are some critical
questions to ask to evaluate the success of ICTs and electoral integrity. Building trust is a
cumulative process and has cognitive, emotional, and behavioral dimensions. In a case study of
politicians’ trust in election technology in Indonesia, Wahid and Prastyo (2013) note three
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interactional determinants of trust: individual behavioral attributes, institutional attributes, and
technology attributes. They find that politicians’ trust in the use of technology in elections is
significantly shaped by both the quality of public information and the institutions that provide this
information. These findings are reinforced by van der Staak and Wolf’s observation:
As neither truly unhackable technology nor entirely tamper-proof manual processes
exist, an essential task in election administration involves the management and
mitigation of manipulation risks through a range of integrity, audit and control
measures (2019, p. 12).
The individual behavioral component of trust is tied to the composition and social capital within
the society; the institutional attributes emanate from political harmony, stability, and level of civil
education; and the technological attributes are related to the openness and design of the ICTs. ICTs
have improved the efficacy of electoral commissions (e.g. India, Ghana, Brazil) and enhance the
overall integrity of elections. But structural factors might subdue this success. As Cheeseman et
al. observe, “in states with a history of corruption, some of the support for digitization may be
disingenuous – motivated more by a desire to open up fresh rent-seeking opportunities than to
improve the quality of elections” (2018, p. 1404). These findings are reinforced by Bertot et al.
(2010) who suggest that citizens’ trust in ICTs is built through a responsive and accountable
mechanism that addresses relevant concerns related to ICTs and accommodates user needs.
Design and Operations of the ICTs
Other than the transparency of the digitization process, the openness embedded in the
design of the technology can be a source of discontent. Candidates and voters often question the
opaqueness of the voting machines as some of them do not provide paper trails. As such, the design
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of the machines, codes, and operations of ICTs in elections can cause significant political bickering
and distrust in some countries. As John Githongo, Kenya’s former anti-corruption tsar, posits, “you
cannot digitize integrity” (cited in Cheeseman et al., 2018). Therefore, the design and integrity of
voting machines to render cleaner elections may be a source of concern. As many countries in
Latin America cast their ballots through computerized voting systems, there are mounting concerns
about the vulnerability of these systems. These systems are susceptible to hacking; additionally,
some of these machines do not have a paper trail system to verify votes. Critics contend that while
EMBs touted the success of these technologies, sometimes, the inherent weaknesses of these
technologies have been overlooked. Other technical issues, for instance, maintaining the
compatibility of different software and upholding the integrity of “codes” remain critical concerns.
Keeping the electoral registers secure, maintaining while also cleaning digital databases is a
gigantic task which needs long-term financial commitment and trained electoral staff. Moreover,
unpleasant structural and technical realities like power cuts and insufficient battery life of some
digital devices might increase the costs of elections while resulting in inaccurate vote counts.
Finally, this literature review suggests that introducing digital technologies into the
electoral process does not offer an easy fix. The effectiveness of digital technologies tends to be
highly nuanced, as country contexts are dissimilar. The success of technologies does not work
linearly because the effectiveness is contingent on a variety of local and national factors. While a
burgeoning literature captures various dynamics that shape the perception of election integrity and
dwell on some of the unintended consequences of digital technologies, most of these findings are
based on micro-case studies. The dissertation addresses this inadequacy in the literature by proving
cross-country evidence regarding the effectiveness of the digitization of electoral processes.
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Chapter 3: Data and Methodology

As the application of ICTs in elections is growing across the globe, proponents claim that
electoral digitization enriches the voting experience and promotes cleaner and more transparent
elections. ICT advocates believe that biometric registration, digitized voter lists, electronic voting
machines, and fingerprint technology for voter identification reduce both time and costs and
reliance on humans to conduct elections, and, thereby, reduce corruption and electoral
malpractices. Digitization of electoral administration accelerates the performance of Electoral
Management Bodies and provides them greater control and surveillance over the management of
elections. Biometric voter registration brings an enhanced ability to detect fraud, removes
fake/ghost voters from registration lists, and reduces problems like falsification and impersonation.
Electronic Voting Machines have the potential to detect multiple voting and eradicate various
problems such as ballot-box stuffing, vandalization of polling stations, and the hurdle of moving
logistics, which have plagued many emerging democracies.
ICT opponents, however, contend that the digitized electoral process invite new
vulnerabilities such as hacking and manipulations by algorithm. As most ICT machines use a black
box approach in their operations, unlike traditional paper-based voting, ICTs reduce the
electorates’ control over their votes and leave little room for observation (Cheeseman et al., 2018;
Evrensel, 2010). Pessimists claim that “codes” used in the different ICT machines are susceptible
to manipulation. Financially, acquiring and maintaining these technologies are costly as some
computerized systems or machines, over the years, might become “dated” (unusable or
compromised). This might cause a constant drain of limited resources to update these technologies
or purchase new ones, and to train electoral personnel to run those machines. ICT opponents also
claim that ICTs may reduce the credibility of elections. As Cheeseman and colleagues (2018) note,
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digital technologies “may create significant opportunities for corruption that (among other things)
… the failure of digital checks and balances often renders an electoral process even more
vulnerable to rigging than it was before” (p. 1397).
Hypothesis
Introducing ICTs in elections does not offer an easy fix. ICTs have the potential to increase
the transparency and credibility of elections. If poorly managed, they may also bring unintended
consequences and vulnerabilities and, thereby, reduce the integrity of elections. To test these
claims and counterclaims regarding the impacts of ICTs on electoral integrity, this dissertation
formulates the following hypothesis:
H1: Countries using ICTs in elections are more likely to have higher levels of perceived
electoral integrity.
Data and Variables
To run an empirical test of the hypothesis (H1), it is important to identify the countries that
have some sort of use of ICTs (e.g. biometric voter registration, EVMs, digital ballot, voting
machines, e-tabulation, etc.) at different stages of the electoral cycle. These data are extracted from
International IDEA’s ICTs in Elections database, which provides a comparative overview of the
global patterns and usage of ICTs at various stages of the electoral cycle. As the information about
the use of ICTs in elections, let alone a global database, was rare, International IDEA launched a
global survey by sending a set of questionnaires to EMBs to document the patterns and usage of
ICTs in elections as well as the challenges in using ICTs.
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Based on the survey responses and electoral legislation, website information, and desk
research, the ICTs in Elections database was gathered and compiled between 2014 and 2016 5
(International IDEA). The database has five major parts, each providing information about: (1)
voter registration and identification; (2) e-voting; (3) processing of results; (4) the use of open
source technology in election administration; and (5) the online publication of data by electoral
management bodies (EMBs). Most of the exogenous variables on ICTs in elections, used in the
regression models, were extracted from this database. While the database is still evolving, and
there are some information discrepancies, ICTs in Elections is nonetheless the only database that
comprises comprehensive information about the digitization of elections across the globe.
Data on electoral integrity was extracted from the PEI database. The Electoral Integrity
Project (EIP) a joint academic research project based at Harvard and Sydney universities, publishes
the PEI Index to measure electoral integrity across the country. Election experts and academics
assess the quality elections in each country based on 49 indicators across 11 major categories of
an election cycle (Norris et al., 2017). PEI publishes both election and country-level data. In this
analysis, I used the PEI 6.5 release, which covers 2,961 experts, evaluating 260 national elections
(both executive and legislative) in 161 countries from 1 July 2012 to 30 June 2017 (Norris, Wynter
& Grömping, 2017). Other control variables used in the regression models were extracted from
the World Bank’s World Governance Indicators (WGI) and World Development Indicators
(WDI). WGI is a research dataset that summarizes the views on the quality of governance across
the world. WDI is World Bank’s compilation of cross-country comparable data on development.

5

Methodology, ICTs in Elections Database. Retrieved from https://www.idea.int/data-tools/data/icts-elections
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Dependent Variable: The Rating of Elections
The central hypothesis (H1) is that increased use of ICTs in elections results in an increase
in the perception of electoral integrity. To test this, I ran several regression models to distinctly
assess which types of ICTs tend to increase the perception of electoral integrity. The primary
dependent variables in most of these regressions are the “rating of electoral integrity” (rating),
measured on a scale of 1-10 (1 =very poor and 10= very good). The variable is obtained from the
PEI country-level database. The dependent variable, rating, is gathered based on PEI experts’
responses to an open-ended and independent question on the overall integrity of elections. PEI
experts then assign each observed election a number on an ordinal scale to 1-10 based on their
perception of the quality of the election. PEI collects the information based on a rolling survey of
election experts and publishes a PEI Index for each country.
It is common in social science to use an aggregate index variable because it tends to be
more comprehensive than single measures (Frank & Coma, 2017). Nonetheless, the index variable
is not free of problems as it gives “…equal weight to all subcomponents, and their components
cannot be included as predictors of overall election quality” (Frank & Coma, 2017, p. 154). As
Garrett finds, “the sign and significance of coefficient estimates from regressions using aggregated
data can differ from regressions using less aggregated data” (2002, p.5). As such, I used experts’
rating of elections instead of the PEI aggregate electoral integrity index, which is calculated by
summing up the 49 indicators and standardized to a 100-point scale.
Using the aggregate index variable in the regression models is problematic due to perceived
aggregation bias (Robinson, 1950; 2009). Extant literature in statistics and econometrics
documents the aggregation bias (Clark & Avery, 1976; Holderness, 2016). The major shortcoming
emanates from the fact that aggregate data yield biased correlation coefficients concerning the
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corresponding values estimated at the individual level (Clark & Avery, 1976). Meadows (1998)
points out, “If too many things are lumped together, their combined message would be
indecipherable” (1998, p. 4).
Independent Variables
Digitization of the electoral process is increasing. ICTs are now being used at different
phases of the election cycle, from pre-election voter education and voter registration, to electronic
voting, to processing and tabulation and transmission of results (Barrat et al., 2015). As such, it is
important to gather data on each type of ICT currently employed in electoral management. These
separate observations on each type of ICT will be useful to differentiate which variety of ICTs
tend to have more impact on the perception of electoral integrity. While ICTs improve efficiency
and performance of EMBs, experts believe that not all ICTs are equally beneficial regarding the
quality of elections. Six variables have been extracted from IDEA’s ICTs in Elections, which have
enough information for each observed country. Each of these ICTs performs different tasks at the
various phases of the electoral cycle. Table 2 presents the code sheet of these seven variables that
have been used in a series of regression models.
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Table 2:Code Sheet for ICTs in Elections
Electoral

Original Survey Question(s)

Cycle
Pre-election

Is biometric data captured and used

Level

during registration?

Assigned

Assigned

Code ID

Code Number

<<bmreg>>

1 = Yes (both
fingerprint scans and
photos)
0 = No

Does the country provide individual

<<onlvreg>>

online voter registration/polling

1= Yes
0= No

assignment checks?
Election-

Is the biometric data used in voter

day

identification at polling stations?
Is technology used for identifying voters

<<bmpoll>>

1= Yes
0= No

<<techpoll>> 1= Yes

at polling stations (electronic poll

0= No

books)?
Does the country publish full voter

<<pollregi>>

registers at the polling station level

1= Yes
0= No

online?
Post-

Are official election results processed by <<etab>>

1= Yes

election

an electronic tabulation system?

0= No

Level
Note: Code sheet developed by the author based on original questions in the dataset.
Pre-Election: Exogenous Observations
At the pre-election phase, “biometric in voter registration” is one of the most widely used
ICTs in electoral management. Biometrics measure and analyze the unique physiological features
– fingerprints, palm prints, retina and iris scans, facial images, and voice patterns – of individual
voters (Wolf et al., 2017b). EMBs uses biometric registration kits to capture and restore each
voter’s physical data digitally, mainly for the identification and verification of the eligibility to
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vote. Once a biometric voter database is prepared, EMBs typically issue a biometric voter ID card
by printing some information from the electronic database such as date of birth, voter’s signature,
a unique registration number and a photo.
Biometric technology can be very useful in enhancing the integrity of elections, mainly by
detecting fraud and removing multiple registrations, falsification, ghost voters, and multiple voting
(Wolf et al., 2017b). The exogenous variable, “biometric in voter registration” (bmreg), has been
obtained from IDEA’s ICTs in Elections database. “Biometric voter registration” (bmreg) is a
binary indicator (1=yes and 0=no), which mainly collects information about whether biometric
data is used during voter registration. As an authentic voter registration list is a sine qua non of a
fair and credible election, a sub-hypothesis regarding this variable assumes:
H2: Countries using BVR are more likely to have higher levels of electoral integrity.
EMBs in some countries tend to have online registration checking provisions based on their
biometric database, which enables voters to check their voting information online and to obtain
information about their assigned polling stations. The specified regression models also add this
important variable, “online registration checks” (onlvreg), which specifies if the country provides
individual online voter registration/polling assignment checks so that voters can verify their
registration. “Online registration checks” is also a binary variable measured as 1 if “yes” and 0 if
“no.”
H3: Countries using online registration checks/polling assignment checks are more likely
to have higher levels of perceived electoral integrity.
On Election Day
On the day of elections, ICTs are used widely in voter identification. If a voter claims
eligibility to vote and brings his or her biometric information (Voter ID card), then a polling staff
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member can verify this information through a database accessible in each polling station. IDEA’s
ICTs in Elections sorted this information under “biometric data in voter identification at polling
stations” (bmpoll), which is again a binary indicator (1=yes and 0=no) collected based on survey
information where biometric data are used, or not, in the process of voter identification at polling
stations. Identification of genuine voters is critically tied with the perceived integrity of elections,
especially where there are not auditable and trusted voter lists. The sub-hypothesis for the variable
assumes:
H4: Countries using biometric data in voter identification at polling stations are more likely
to have higher levels of perceived electoral integrity.
Data on “poll registration publication” (pollregi), a binary indicator (1=yes and 0=no),
also merit attention here. It indicates if the country publishes full voter registers at the polling
station level online. The sub-hypothesis for the variable is:
H5: Countries publishing data on poll registration at the polling station level are more
likely to have higher levels of perceived electoral integrity.
Nowadays, the use of electronic poll books (e-poll books) is becoming increasingly
prevalent in many countries. Thirty-six states in the United States use some sort of e-poll books,
which come in a variety of forms and can perform numerous functions. These poll books are
typically accessed using a laptop or tablet that enables a polling officer to review and maintain
voters’ information. Modern e-poll books provide a range of uses: voters can sign electronically;
polling staff members can review voters’ information and can pull it up by scanning a voter ID
card; polling staff members can redirect voters to a designated polling station, etc. Because of
speed, accuracy, and convenience, e-poll books might contribute to improving electoral integrity.
Based on the consideration and importance, the e-poll book is also included in the model
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specification. “Technology in polling stations,” (techpoll) is a binary indicator (1=yes and 0=no),
which relates to whether poll book technology was used for identifying voters at polling stations.
The hypothesis is:
H6: Countries using technology in polling stations (e-poll books) are more likely to have
higher levels of perceived electoral integrity.
Post-Election Period
At the post-election period, many EMBs opt to use an electronic counting process to tally
the votes and transmit the results to a central location. Electronic tabulation refers to the application
of technologies – electronic devices that automate and count the votes. Some are supervised while
others are unsupervised depending on the location of voting. For example, if the devices are
deployed at polling stations, polling managers can supervise the counting process, but the system
might function unsupervised in the case of Internet voting. However, there is growing controversy
and suspicion about the integrity of these systems.
Proponents claim that e-tabulation increases transparency and reduces the time and costs
involved in counting and transmitting results. Opponents, however, claim that these technologies
invite new vulnerabilities because they are susceptible to manipulation. These concerns can be
exacerbated if proper attention is not paid to checking, verifying, and overseeing these new
technologies. Election experts believe that voters might lose confidence in the integrity of these
new and unfamiliar technologies if massive voter education does not take place well in advance of
an election. Some ICT experts contend that the “source codes” used in tallying must be published
for political parties, civil societies, and the public to verify the integrity of electronic systems.
Considering the significance of this controversy, “e-tabulation” (etab) is also included in the
regression models. IDEA’s ICTs in Elections collects this information by asking whether official
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election results were processed by an electronic tabulation system (1=yes and 0=no). A subhypothesis is:
H7: Countries using e-tabulation for processing election results are more likely to have
higher levels of perceived electoral integrity.
In the analysis of the data in Chapter 4, I report the results of a series of regressions I
conducted to test these hypotheses.
Control Variables
The extent to which ICTs increase or decrease electoral integrity is highly nuanced, as
many structural and contextual factors come into play in the empirical assessment of the
relationships. While ICTs have the potential to profoundly alter the contexts, the use of ICTs is
also contingent on a range of factors that must be considered in the empirical models. Existing
research indicates that the application of ICTs is a function of legal reform (e.g. electoral laws),
financial commitment, and technological viability. EMBs often need to reform existing electoral
laws to acquire and use ICTs.
Digitization of the electoral process, therefore, involves substantial investment in ICTs and
human capital. For instance, an intermittent power supply, and low level of ICT infrastructure, and
weak internet penetration may hinder the deployment of computer-based electoral management.
These are critical factors that mediate ICT-electoral integrity relationships. The regression models,
thus, necessitate controlling for these variables to see the combined effect of these conditions along
with the exogenous variables. I estimated a multilevel mixed-effects ordered logistic regression
model and controlled for a number of variables that earlier research found to be important. I
extracted these variables from WDI, WGI, Freedom House’s Freedom in the World, and CIRI
Human Rights dataset. These are research datasets and widely used by political science and peace
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and conflict studies researchers. WDI compiles cross-country data on development indicators, and
WGI reports on six dimensions of global governance indicators including rule of law, control of
corruption, voice and accountability, etc. Freedom Houses publishes a freedom index of political
and civil rights, and the CIRI Human Rights dataset contains standards-based quantitative
information on government respect for 15 internationally recognized human rights for 202
countries. Building on Frank and Coma (2017), the regression models include several state-level
variables such as characteristics of governance, demography, and level of economic development,
which are described below.
Population Size
Large electorates put a huge resource burden on EMBs. In countries like India, Bangladesh,
Indonesia, and Pakistan, holding elections is a gigantic task. Completing registration of millions
of voters, issuing voter IDs, managing electoral staff, and moving logistics of equipment, like
ballot boxes. across a vast swath of an entire country and holding elections with thousands of
candidates in hundreds or thousands of constitutional jurisdictions often on strict schedules is a
challenging task.
EMBs need to maintain strict security measures and efficiency. With hundreds or
thousands of poll workers, security personnel, and election officials, EMBs in populous countries
might opt for ICTs in elections to reduce financial and security burdens as well as to enhance
managerial control (reducing human error, tampering, ballot stuffing, etc.) over elections. The
regression models control for the size of the population, which is extracted from the World
Bank’s WDI. Frank and Coma (2017) argue that countries with smaller populations are more
likely to have higher levels of integrity. As population size varies across countries, in the
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regression models, a natural log of the country’s total population size has been introduced mainly
to minimize skewness of data.
GDP Per Capita (Wealth)
Going digital is a serious policy decision that involves significant investments in ICT equipment,
maintaining it, and training electoral staff. Lipset (1959) contends that the state’s economic
development is critically tied to democratic sustainability. Frank and Coma argue that “…if a
wealthier nation has a better chance of sustaining democracy than a poorer one, then wealthier
nations would by extension also be more likely to have elections that are free and fair” (2017, p.
157). As such, wealthier nations tend to have more capacity and a more supportive political
structure to innovate and digitize electoral management. Frank and Coma (2017) find evidence
that wealthier countries exhibit higher levels of electoral integrity. To assess the impact of
economic development, regression models also include the gross domestic product (GDP) – logged
per capita in constant 2010 US dollars. This is extracted from WDI (World Bank, 2018).
The Control of Corruption
In many emerging democracies, incumbents’ abuse of the state’s resource and unlawful
ties with electoral staff can undermine citizens’ confidence in elections. A recent report by the
International Foundation for Electoral Systems (IFES), Unfair Advantage: The Abuse of State
Resources in Elections (2017), echoes this argument. It suggests that, in many developing
countries, politicians “…can take advantage of a politicized civil service, public contractors,
government communications and state media, and other means of in-kind support to both enrich
themselves and gain an unfair electoral advantage” (Ritchie & Shein, 2017, p. n.d., para. 2).
To assess the impact of corruption, the models include control of corruption, which
“captures perceptions of the extent to which public power is exercised for private gain, including
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both petty and grand forms of corruption, as well as “capture” of the state by elites and
private interests 6 (World Bank, 2018, p.n.d.). Obtained from World Bank’s WGI, it measures
corruption in each country on a standardized scale of -2.5 to 2.5 (higher scores indicate less
corruption). WGI is one of the reliable research databases on governance worldwide, which mainly
reports on six broad dimensions of governance indicators. It uses a methodology called unobserved
components model to publish composite governance indicators based on 30 underlying data
sources. The governance indicators are widely used by development and political science
researchers.
Political Freedom
The regression models also control for political freedom, as it is the bedrock of electoral integrity.
This variable is available through Freedom House’s Freedom in the World database (2018), which
is measured on a 7-point scale. The scale has been reversed where 1 denotes “not free” and 7
denotes “free.” The Global Commission on Elections, Democracy and Security in a report,
Deepening Democracy: A Strategy for Improving the Integrity of Elections Worldwide, asserts,
“At its root, electoral integrity is a political problem,” not just a technical problem” (2012, p.16).
Electoral integrity depends on the publics’ confidence that they have political freedom to
participate in political decision making. As such, political freedom is a building block of genuine
elections that guarantee that every citizen can exercise their democratic rights freely. The higher
the level of political freedom, the better the chance that citizens can participate openly in political
processes and that individuals are free to select their leaders in a genuinely competitive election.

6

Control of Corruption: Estimate. Retrieved from https://datacatalog.worldbank.org/control-corruption-estimate-0
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Regime Characteristics and Physical Integrity Rights
Lastly, two additional variables – physical integrity rights and regime characteristics – are
included in the regression models. Walsh and Piazza (2010) contend that governments’ violations
of physical integrity rights – the arbitrary infliction of physical harms on individuals, torture,
extrajudicial killings, and political murders – undermine public confidence in the integrity of
elections. Physical integrity rights are available from the CIRI Human Rights dataset (Cingranelli
et al., 2014), which ranges from 0 (no government respect for these four rights) to 8 (full
government respect for these four rights).
Regime structure also can significantly affect the electoral process (Frank & Coma, 2017).
Electoral malpractice and manipulation tend to be prevalent in highly autocratic regimes since they
are more likely to suppress the electoral rights of people. This variable is extracted from the
Political Instability Task Force’s Polity IV: Regime Authority Characteristics and Transitions
Datasets, which captures differences in regime authority structure, which is measured on a scale
of -10 to 10. Table 3 presents summary statistics for each of the variables included in the models.
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Table 3: Summary Statistics of the Variables
Variables

Obs Mean

Std. Dev

Min

Max

Data
Source
PEI

Rating of electoral 159
integrity
Biometric data at
119
polling stations
E-tabulation
152

6.367792 2.196571 1.375

9.875

.302521

.4612919 0

1

.6973684 .4609158 0

1

ln(GDP per
capita)
ln(Population
Size)
Regime Authority
Structure
Political Rights

157

8.52954

160

15.98326 1.79079

144

4.659722 5.837141 -10

10

Polity IV

161

4.677019 2.114245 1

8

Physical Integrity
Rights
Internet
Penetration
Parties/candidates
had fair access
Election
authorities were
impartial
Laws favored
incumbent
Elections were
well managed
Electoral register
inaccuracy
Results with
undue delay
Votes counted
fairly

161

4.708075 2.243434 0

8

Freedom
House
CIRI

160

48.77112 27.34617 3.761414 98.24002

WDI

161

2.808623 .7654677 1.176471 4.529412

PEI

161

3.274445 1.01823

1.117647 4.875

PEI

161

2.955364 .949806

1

4.722222

PEI

160

3.469278 .8458754 1.333333 4.941176

PEI

160

3.063072 .8981512 1.125

PEI

160

3.693216 .8219988 1.428571 5

PEI

160

3.640765 .9453517 1.4

PEI

1.428475 5.422869 11.40872
11.56112 21.00405

4.9375

4.944444

ICT in
Elections
ICT in
Elections
WDI
WDI
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Chapter 4: Data Analyses and Findings

As stated in chapter 3, this dissertation examines whether the use of ICTs in election
administration improves the perception of electoral integrity. I extracted key regressors from the
ICT in Elections and the dependent variable, rating of electoral integrity, from PEI database. Since
the regressand is an ordinal variable (measured on a scale of 1-10), following Frank and Coma
(2017), this study uses multilevel mixed-effects ordered logistic regression to assess the effect of
ICTs on perceptions of electoral integrity. Multilevel models are suitable to infer relationships
where data involves more than one level of analysis. The use of ordered regression models is quite
common in educational science, psychology, and social science (Bauer & Sterba, 2011; O’Connell,
2010), where response variables are obtained through a natural hierarchy of an ordinal scale (e.g.
“Strongly agree,” “Somewhat agree”).
A growing body of literature discusses the significance of this estimation procedure in
dealing with ordered and hierarchically nested data (Goldstein, 2011; Johnson, 2010; Hedeker,
2003). For instance, Hedeker points out that the multilevel model allows “…flexibility in the
choice of contrasts used to represent comparisons across the response categories” (2003, p. 1433).
Multilevel models, alternatively known as hierarchical, mixed-effects, and nested models, are an
extension of traditional regression models that “….account for the structuring of data across
aggregate groupings, that is, they explicitly account for the nested nature of data across multiple
levels of analysis” (Johnson, 2010, p. 4).
To test the hypothesis (H1) – the usage of ICTs in electoral management improves the
perceptions of electoral integrity – this study has run a series of regressions with all exogenous
variables extracted from the ICTs in Elections dataset. Also extracted are data on a set of controls
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deemed essential for predicting the relationships. In chapter 3, six exogenous variables were
presented that cover different forms of ICTs employed at various stages of an electoral cycle. I
estimate a separate regression equation for each of the regressors and test their corresponding
hypotheses, elaborated in chapter 3. Table 4 presents the results of these preliminary regression
analyses of multilevel mixed-effects ordered logistic models. In all equations, the regressand
(dependent) variable is the PEI experts’ overall “rating of electoral integrity” (rating). The
regression models include a set of state-level controls and dummies (1=if a country belongs a
particular region, and 0=if otherwise) for each region. Dummies imply the presence and absence
of some categorical effect. These dummies are important to assess how regional variations affect
the rating electoral integrity. This primary assessment shows only two exogenous variables –
“biometric data at polling stations” and “e-tabulation” are statistically important and exhibit
consistent evidence regarding their associated hypotheses. Other exogenous variables have died
out in the preliminary analyses and shown no statistical value, although they tend to have an
expected positive correlation with the regressand – experts’ ratings of electoral integrity.
Table 4’s findings indicate that there is no consistent statistically significant evidence
regarding the sub-hypotheses H2 (Countries using BVR are more likely to have higher levels of
electoral integrity), H3 (Countries using online registration checks/polling assignment checks are
more likely to have higher levels of perceived electoral integrity), H5 (Countries publishing data
on poll registration at the polling station level are more likely to have higher levels of perceived
electoral integrity), and H6 (Countries using technology in polling stations are more likely to have
higher levels of perceived electoral integrity), other than their positive relationships with electoral
integrity. Although these findings do not corroborate a conclusive judgment about the relevance
and importance of these ICT applications in election management, Table 4’s results showcase that
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some variables do not carry statistical merits to further develop and discuss these models. As such,
I have dropped these variables from further testing and analyses and decided to proceed with
“biometric data at polling stations” and “e-tabulation.”
Table 4: Results of Preliminary Regression Analyses with all Exogenous Variables
Variables
Election
technologies

(1)
Biometric in
voter
registration
0.415
(0.686)

(2)
Biometric
identification at
polling stations
0.792*
(0.464)

(3)
Etabulation

(4)
Online voter
registration

(5)
Technologies at
polling stations

-0.679*

0.0207

0.103

(6)
Poll
registration
publication
0.237

(0.383)

(0.419)

(0.405)

(0.525)

State-Level Controls
ln(GDP per
capita)
ln(Population
Size)
Regime
Authority
Structure
Control of
Corruption
Political Rights
Physical
Integrity Rights
Internet
Penetration

0.152

0.101

-0.0126

0.0130

0.183

0.0753

(0.387)
-0.132

(0.282)
-0.0540

(0.272)
0.0608

(0.272)
0.0596

(0.288)
0.105

(0.274)
0.0268

(0.216)
0.136

(0.164)
0.104

(0.136)
0.139**

(0.142)
0.128**

(0.169)
0.0881

(0.139)
0.124**

(0.0956)
1.991***

(0.0686)
2.177***

(0.0588)
2.444***

(0.0603)
2.337***

(0.0707)
2.396***

(0.0601)
2.283***

(0.617)
0.508*
(0.300)
-0.208

(0.397)
0.802***
(0.247)
-0.243*

(0.380)
0.693***
(0.205)
-0.169

(0.374)
0.695***
(0.213)
-0.158

(0.398)
0.767***
(0.251)
-0.113

(0.371)
0.738***
(0.211)
-0.176

(0.185)
-0.0162

(0.143)
0.00207

(0.123)
-0.00528

(0.131)
-0.00648

(0.149)
-0.00445

(0.124)
-0.00675

(0.0217)

(0.0176)

(0.0157)

(0.0156)

(0.0170)

(0.0158)

Regional Controls
East Asia and
Pacific
Europe &
Central Asia
Latin America
& Caribbean
Middle East &
North Africa

0.471

-0.273

-0.194

-0.113

0.0128

-0.132

(1.344)
0.484

(1.037)
-0.0295

(0.885)
0.771

(0.885)
0.783

(0.927)
0.158

(0.887)
0.709

(1.509)
1.135

(1.116)
0.122

(0.929)
1.021

(0.935)
0.972

(0.984)
0.553

(0.934)
0.923

(1.469)
0.807

(1.055)
0.398

(0.895)
1.094

(0.898)
1.292

(0.927)
0.587

(0.902)
1.205

(1.492)

(1.136)

(0.975)

(0.972)

(1.070)

(0.970)
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North America

-0.512
(1.976)
0.438

-2.033
(1.746)
-0.343

-1.505
(1.775)
0.243

-1.505
(1.777)
0.422

-0.554
(1.780)
0.195

-1.487
(1.757)
0.325

(1.199)

(0.953)

(0.810)

(0.817)

(0.842)

(0.811)

Log likelihood
Wald chi2

-226.162
53.86

-419.384
110.29

-528.715

-530.289
135.10

-402.729
111.51

-523.736
134.60

AIC

602.324

1072.769

1331.432

1334.579

1031.459

1319.473

64

110

133

133

108

132

64

110

133

133

108

132

Sub-Saharan
Africa

Observations of
elections
# countries

Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Cut points of rating level estimated but excluded to save space.

After screening the independent variables through the preliminary regression analyses, I
developed a base model with two exogenous variables – “biometric data at polling stations” and
“e-tabulation” – and regressand rating of electoral integrity. These base models include a set of
state-level controls such as GDP per capita (logged), the size of the population (logged), control
of corruption, regime structure, physician integrity rights, political freedoms, and the level of
penetration of the Internet. Application of ICTs in election management and state-level structural
factors vary from region to region. To capture these variations, the regression equations also
include several dummies for each region. Table 5 presents the results of these regression analyses
of multilevel mixed-effects ordered logistic models.
Table 5: Regression Results of ICT and Electoral Integrity (Base Model)
Variables
Biometric data at polling
stations
E-tabulation

Model 1
Perceived Electoral
Integrity

Model 2
Perceived Electoral
Integrity

0.792*
(0.464)
State-Level Controls

-0.679*
(0.383)
56

ln(GDP per capita)

0.101
-0.0126
(0.282)
(0.272)
ln(Population Size)
-0.0540
0.0608
(0.164)
(0.136)
Regime Authority Structure
0.104
0.139**
(0.0686)
(0.0588)
Control of Corruption
2.177***
2.444***
(0.397)
(0.380)
Political Rights
0.802***
0.693***
(0.247)
(0.205)
Physical Integrity Rights
-0.243*
-0.169
(0.143)
(0.123)
Internet Penetration
0.00207
-0.00528
(0.0176)
(0.0157)
Regional Dummies
East Asia & Pacific
-0.273
-0.194
(1.037)
(0.885)
Europe & Central Asia
-0.0295
0.771
(1.116)
(0.929)
Latin America & Caribbean
0.122
1.021
(1.055)
(0.895)
Middle East & North Africa
0.398
1.094
(1.136)
(0.975)
North America
-2.033
-1.505
(1.746)
(1.775)
Sub-Saharan Africa
-0.343
0.243
(0.953)
(0.810)
Log likelihood
-419.38437
-528.71591
Wald chi2
110.29
139.00
AIC
1072.769
1330.238
Observations of elections
110
133
Note: Multilevel mixed-effects ordered logistic results. Standard errors in parentheses.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Cut points of electoral rating estimated but excluded to
save space.

The base model’s results in Table 5 reveals contradictory evidence regarding the
underlying hypothesis in H1. On the one hand, in light with the main hypothesis, model 1’s
coefficient displays a positive sign, which supports the view that countries using biometric data in
voter identification at polling stations are more likely to have elections with higher levels of
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perceived electoral integrity. This result is true even controlling for all other state-level variables
and regional dummies.
This finding supports the sub-hypotheses in H4 and corroborates cyber optimists’ claim
that the application of biometric technology in election management reduces time and costs and
increases voters’ trust in elections. Nowadays, electoral malpractice like multiple registrations,
falsification and impersonation, multiple voting, ballot-box stuffing, and manipulation are
prevalent across the globe. As such, many emerging democracies find these biometric machines
as cost-effective solutions to optimize resources and increase the transparency of the voting
experience on election day. Model 1’s findings substantiate the fact that some of these hopes
related to ICT are well founded.
Model 2’s coefficient, contrastingly, reveals a negative sign, which indicates that countries
using e-tabulation for processing election results are more likely to have elections with decreased
levels of electoral integrity. This finding negates the sub-hypothesis in H7, but it corroborates cyber
pessimists’ claim that computerized voting procedures and electronic tallying of votes undermine
electoral credibility, as these automated counting processes can be manipulated by twisting the
“source codes” that run the program.
These contradictory findings related to electronic tabulation are not specious, as voters
sometimes are skeptical about these electronic systems and exhibit low trust in these technologies.
There is mounting evidence that electronic tabulation and transmission of voting results have been
disrupted in many countries due to software manipulation, breaches of security and integrity, and
malfunction (Alvarez et al., 2008). The e-tabulation system can also be a target of digital hacking
to manipulate results. Critics contend, since these systems often function in a “black-box” manner,
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it is hard to independently verify the tallying process unless abundant caution is taken by election
commissions.
In models 1 and 2, most of the state-level controls display the expected sign; however, only
the control of corruption, physical integrity rights, political freedoms, and regime authority
structure are statistically significant. In both models, control of corruption exhibits a strong
positive effect on perceived electoral integrity, which indicates that countries with higher levels of
control of corruption are likely to have elections with a higher level of electoral integrity. Respect
for political freedom and rights are also critically important in elections, as these rights are viewed
as the foundation of competitive elections. Countries with higher political freedom tend to have
free and credible elections. Table 5’s results substantiate these assertations. In both models,
political rights and freedom show a strong positive correlation, which corroborates the arguments
that countries with a higher level of political rights are more likely to have elections with a high
level of electoral integrity.
In the base model, there is also an observable consistency regarding physical integrity
rights – freedom from political torture and arbitrary imprisonment, etc. In emerging democracies,
ruling elites often exploit political torture, arbitrary imprisonment, kidnapping, and threats to
restrict opposing elites’ participation in elections, even at the risk of undermining voters’
confidence in political competition. In models 1 and 2, physical integrity rights exhibit a negative
sign, which indicates that countries with higher levels of violations of physical integrity rights are
more likely to have elections with decreased levels of electoral integrity. The base model reveals
several interesting findings regarding the impact of ICT on electoral integrity. In the subsequent
section, these models will be developed further to check the robustness of these findings.
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Testing Robustness of Base Models’ Findings
It has been a common practice in empirical studies to perform a “robustness check” – a
process to see whether the alternative specification of the models changes the conclusion drawn
from the base models. The main issue associated with a “robustness check” is to examine “how
certain ‘core’ regression coefficient estimates behave when the regression specification is modified
in some way, typically by adding or removing regressors” (Lu & White, 2014, p. 1). Leamer
(1983), a proponent of the technique, contends that fragile regression coefficients could be an
indication of specification errors, which necessitates performing a robustness check to identify
these misspecifications. If the sign and magnitude of the coefficients in the alternative model
specifications do not differ much, it is generally taken as evidence that the coefficients are robust
and can dependably be translated as true causal effects of the associated regressors (Lu & White,
2014). To validate the findings in models 1 and 2 (Table 5), the study exploits a range of robustness
check techniques, which are discussed below.
Election-Level Controls
First, the estimated base models (Table 5) include three additional regressors – electionlevel controls – to see how the “core” coefficients behave along with variables. These three
regressors are extracted from the PEI dataset, which is related to the elections: (1)
parties/candidates had fair access to political broadcasts and advertising; (2) election authorities
were impartial, and (3) laws favored incumbents. Frank and Coma (2017) find strong evidence
that these three regressors significantly shape the perception of electoral integrity. Together with
these regressors, the robustness analysis replicates a mixed-methods multilevel ordered logistics
regression. Table 6 presents the regression results of these three additional election-level
regressors.
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Table 6: Results of Electoral Integrity with Election-level Regressors
Model 3
Perceived
Electoral
Integrity

Variables

Biometric data at polling stations

0.795*
(0.465)

E-tabulation
ln(GDP per capita)

State-Level Controls

ln(Population Size)
Regime Authority Structure
Control of Corruption
Political Rights
Physical Integrity Rights
Internet Penetration
Parties/candidates had fair access

Election Level Controls

Election authorities were impartial
Laws favored incumbents
East Asia & Pacific
Europe & Central Asia
Latin America & Caribbean
Middle East & North Africa
North America
Sub-Saharan Africa

Regional Dummies

Model 4
Perceived
Electoral
Integrity

-0.805**
(0.392)

0.173
(0.284)
-0.0164
(0.168)
0.106
(0.0676)
2.216***
(0.412)
0.897***
(0.248)
-0.299**
(0.148)
0.00875
(0.0180)

-0.0214
(0.274)
0.0931
(0.140)
0.138**
(0.0588)
2.458***
(0.387)
0.725***
(0.207)
-0.182
(0.127)
0.00379
(0.0163)

0.437
(0.438)
0.605*
(0.314)
-0.972***
(0.371)

0.132
(0.397)
0.615**
(0.288)
-0.689**
(0.329)

0.367
(1.132)
0.111
(1.205)
0.518
(1.151)
0.857
(1.219)
-2.389
(1.740)
0.435
(1.054)

-0.144
(0.911)
0.625
(0.947)
0.930
(0.912)
1.105
(0.972)
-1.972
(1.660)
0.524
(0.814)
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Log Likelihood
-415.08505
-525.119
Wald chi2
113.26
139.00
AIC
1070.17
1330.238
Observations of elections
110
133
Note: Results of multilevel mixed-effects ordered logistic. Standard errors in parentheses;
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Cut points of electoral integrity level estimated but
excluded to save space.

In models 3 and 4, the regressands are electoral integrity (rating) and the variables of
interest are biometric data at polling stations and e-tabulation respectively. After adding three
election-level controls, the coefficients in Table 6 retain statistical significance and exhibit the
expected signs of the base models. The magnitude of these coefficients in models 3 and 4 even
improved slightly. These findings are consistent with model 1 and 2, and strongly indicate that
biometric data at polling stations tend to have higher level positive impacts on the perception of
electoral integrity. Similar to the finding in model 2, model 3’s negative coefficient provides
evidence that countries using e-tabulation for processing results are more likely to have elections
with lower levels of perceived electoral integrity.
The findings shown in Table 6’s also reveal that the election-level regressors are critically
important regarding the perceptions of electoral integrity. Coefficients in models 3 and 4 indicate
that countries where election authorities are impartial are more likely to have elections with higher
levels of electoral integrity. The results also corroborate the claims that elections in which laws
favored incumbents are more likely to have decreased levels of electoral integrity. In some
emerging democracies, incumbents might gain disproportionate “clout” by manipulating electoral
laws, undermining voters’ confidence in the electoral outcomes. Because of the high stakes for
winning (access to resources and power), incumbents and nefarious actors sometimes threaten
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electoral staff and polling center managers to manipulate voting results (Callen et al. 2015). The
findings presented in Table 6 provide evidence that these assertions are not baseless.
Alternative Model Specifications and Anchoring Vignettes
Second, the analysis specifies an ordered probit model and anchor vignettes to see how the
two “core” coefficients behave due to the change of model assumptions. Although experts’ surveys
have gained prominence in comparative political science, there is a growing debate regarding the
validity of the findings that draw on these survey data (Coma & Van Ham, 2015; Steenbergen &
Marks, 2007; Budge, 2000). These validity issues of experts’ judgments were raised by Budge
(2000) in an article on the assessment of the use and limitations of experts’ surveys. Critics raise
a series of questions, but the most relatable ones include: How valid is the information that is
gleaned from these experts’ responses to certain subjective categories? How can one gather valid
responses from different experts? Since we tend to filter information, how do their personal bias,
background, and prejudice shape their assessment of subjective categories? How can one be sure
that experts evaluate the questions in the way they envisioned? The validity issues are not specious,
as critics contend, “…different experts judging different objects, on different dimensions, at
different points in time” (Steenbergen & Marks, 2007, p. 351). The validity concerns become more
serious when the subject of the assessment itself is complex. For instance, Coma & Van Ham
(2015) argue that since electoral integrity is a complex issue questions related to the measurement
of the quality of elections could be perceived and interpreted differently by a range of experts.
One pertinent empirical solution to address these validity concerns of experts’ judgment is
to use a technique called “anchoring vignettes” (King et al., 2004; Javaras & Ripley, 2007; King
& Wand, 2007). Vignettes refer to hypothetical situations presented to experts, in which they act
both as actors and observers (Collett & Childs, 2011). Anchoring vignettes was used by King and
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colleagues (2004) to minimize the personal bias of heterogenous subject experts by recording their
responses to hypothetical scenarios.
Many experts’ surveys use these anchoring vignettes to assess the variations in experts’
surveys. PEI’s dataset also exploits these empirical techniques. To check the robustness of findings
in Table 6, the regression model controls for the following vignettes, which are extracted from the
PEI dataset. (1) How seriously do you think electoral integrity is undermined if in STATE A some
voters had to wait in long lines to vote?; (2) How seriously do you think that electoral integrity is
undermined in STATE B if the opposition decides to boycott an election, so the government wins
most seats by default?; and (3) How seriously do you think electoral integrity is undermined in
STATE C if election results lead to widespread violence throughout the country?.
PEI data measures responses to these vignettes on a scale of 1 to10, where 1 means that
electoral integrity is not seriously undermined and 10 means that electoral integrity is seriously
undermined (Norris et al., 2018). In the regression analysis, these scales of vignettes are reversed
to align with the scale of regressand (rating).
Table 7:Results of Electoral Integrity Anchoring Vignettes
Variables
Biometric data at polling stations
E-tabulation

Model 5
Electoral Integrity
0.492*
(0.265)

State-level Controls
0.110
(0.181)
ln(Population Size)
-0.0192
(0.0913)
Regime Authority Structure
0.0742**
(0.0373)
Control of Corruption
1.184***
ln(GDP per capita)

Model 6
Electoral Integrity

-0.501**
(0.221)
0.0428
(0.166)
0.0405
(0.0775)
0.0766**
(0.0326)
1.345***
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(0.235)
(0.217)
Political Rights
0.407***
0.376***
(0.134)
(0.113)
Physical Integrity Rights
-0.170*
-0.115
(0.0891)
(0.0754)
Internet Penetration
0.00306
5.96e-06
(0.0108)
(0.00943)
Election-level Controls
Parties/candidates had fair access
0.176
0.00286
(0.238)
(0.211)
Election authorities were impartial
0.418**
0.434***
(0.191)
(0.166)
Laws favored incumbent
-0.650***
-0.463***
(0.215)
(0.177)
Anchoring vignettes
Vignette 1
0.0370
-0.00405
(0.141)
(0.126)
Vignette 2
-0.137
-0.0936
(0.140)
(0.131)
Vignette 3
0.0782
0.136
(0.151)
(0.136)
Regional Dummies
East Asia & Pacific
0.241
-0.149
(0.692)
(0.526)
Europe & Central Asia
0.161
0.363
(0.702)
(0.534)
Latin America & Caribbean
0.408
0.659
(0.675)
(0.512)
The Middle East & North Africa
0.492
0.514
(0.711)
(0.554)
North America
-1.099
-0.997
(1.005)
(0.907)
Sub-Saharan Africa
0.402
0.377
(0.632)
(0.465)
Log Likelihood
-396.90188
-510.17661
LR chi2
169.66
208.53
Pseudo R2
0.1761
0.1697
Observations of elections
105
129
Note: Results of ordered probit models. Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, **
p<0.05, * p<0.1. Cut points of electoral integrity estimated but excluded to save space.

Table 7 presents the results of ordered probit regression models controlling for vignettes. The signs
of the coefficients in both models 5 and 6 are statistically significant and consistent with that of
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previous models, even with controlling for the vignettes. The regression results also do not show
noticeable impacts of vignettes on the experts’ ratings of electoral integrity. The results from these
alternative regression models, along with additional election-level regressors and vignettes, show
strong consistency with the findings of previous models.
Testing a New Dependent Variable
Third, I calculated a new dependent variable from the PEI dataset by averaging all the
experts’ ratings about perceived electoral integrity available for each country for different election
types and years. I test how coefficients of “biometric data at polling stations” and “electronic
tabulation” behave by adding the new regressand called “averaged ratings.” This new dependent
variable is calculated for two reasons. The PEI’s perceived electoral integrity dataset has multiple
observations for both presidential and legislative elections. For instance, in the PEI dataset,
Kazakhstan’s electoral ratings are available for both presidential and legislative elections, whereas
Kenya has electoral ratings for three presidential elections in different years and months. PEI’s
experts rate the perceived integrity of these elections separately.
The original dependent variable consists of the latest electoral ratings available for each
country but did not combine the electoral ratings of both presidential and legislative elections. The
regressand used in the models above was calculated either based on presidential or legislative
elections, whichever election was the latest. This may raise questions since the “electoral ratings”
in countries where there are multiple selections could be quite different across the different
elections. To mitigate these concerns, I averaged experts’ ratings for all available elections in the
dataset and generated an alternative dependent variable, averaged ratings. Models 7 and 8 in Table
8 presents the results of ordered probit regressions with “averaged ratings” as the new regressand.
Inconsistent with previous models, all other regressors and controls remain the same.
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Table 8: Ordered Probit Regression Results with Averaged Rating
Variables
Biometric data at polling stations
E-tabulation

Model 7
Model 8
Averaged Ratings Averaged Ratings
0.455*
(0.266)

State-level Controls
0.130
(0.180)
ln(Population Size)
-0.0175
(0.0910)
Regime Authority Structure
0.0707*
(0.0372)
Control of Corruption
1.117***
(0.234)
Political Rights
0.414***
(0.134)
Physical Integrity Rights
-0.155*
(0.0882)
Internet Penetration
0.00666
(0.0107)
Election-level Controls
Parties/candidates had fair access
0.0713
(0.238)
Election authorities were impartial
0.503***
(0.190)
Laws favored incumbent
-0.664***
(0.214)
Anchoring vignettes
Vignette 1
0.0608
(0.140)
Vignette 2
-0.146
(0.139)
Vignette 3
0.0867
(0.150)
Regional Dummies
East Asia & Pacific
0.0838
(0.693)
Europe & Central Asia
-0.126
(0.702)
Latin America & Caribbean
0.0376
(0.674)
Middle East & North Africa
0.199
ln(GDP per capita)

-0.551**
(0.219)
0.0955
(0.161)
0.0474
(0.0771)
0.0743**
(0.0328)
1.230***
(0.218)
0.409***
(0.115)
-0.103
(0.0749)
0.00270
(0.00942)
-0.0623
(0.209)
0.517***
(0.166)
-0.519***
(0.176)
0.00517
(0.126)
-0.0885
(0.131)
0.151
(0.135)
-0.304
(0.528)
0.0999
(0.535)
0.256
(0.520)
0.296
67

(0.710)
(0.554)
North America
-1.459
-1.346
(1.006)
(0.907)
Sub-Saharan Africa
0.282
0.311
(0.632)
(0.464)
Log-Likelihood
-402.66074
-515.9006
LR chi2
172.24
213.30
Pseudo R2
0.1762
0.1713
Observations of elections
106
130
Note: Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Cut points of rating level estimated but excluded here to save space.

The coefficients in models 7 and 8 retain statistical significance and expected signs of the
previous models, which showcase that the two conclusions that I draw related to the impact of ICT
on perceived electoral integrity are robust and consistent. Since the base model’s findings survive
all the robustness checks, at this stage, I will assess the impacts of ICT on the overall management
of the electoral administration. The following section sheds light on these analyses.
Which aspects of the electoral management tend to gain more benefits from the use of
biometric data at polling stations? What are the relevant concerns about the use of electronic
tabulation and results transmission? To examine these questions, I conducted a series of ordered
logistics regressions. I have extracted four additional dependent variables from the PEI’s 2 subcategories: voter registration and vote count respectively. From PEI’s voter registration category,
I extracted managed and regiaccurate2. I then regressed these two separate regressands (Y) on
“biometric data at polling stations” (X) in two separate models along with all other controls of
previous models. Table 9 presents the results of the ordered logistics models. The findings in
model 10 indicate that countries using biometric data at polling stations in elections are more likely
to have higher levels of perceived accuracy in the electoral registers. Model 9’s results reveal a
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positive correlation with the overall management of elections, but the relationship is not
statistically significant.
Table 9: Ordered Logistics Regression Results with Different Regressands
Variables

Model 9 Model 10
Managed Registration
Accuracy
Biometric data at polling stations 0.232
0.799*
(0.446)
(0.446)
E-tabulation

Model 11 Model 12
Delay Fair Count

-0.537
(0.372)

-0.785**
(0.374)

State Level Controls
0.302
0.688**
0.458*
0.304
(0.272)
(0.297)
(0.267)
(0.268)
ln(Population Size)
-0.101
-0.0678
0.0314
0.0325
(0.162)
(0.167)
(0.128)
(0.131)
Regime Authority Structure
-0.0626
-0.0486
-0.0127
0.0788
(0.0652)
(0.0602)
(0.0538) (0.0577)
Control of Corruption
1.699*** 1.264***
1.499*** 1.893***
(0.364)
(0.395)
(0.360)
(0.355)
Political Rights
0.511**
0.392*
0.167
0.614***
(0.224)
(0.221)
(0.189)
(0.200)
Physical Integrity Rights
-0.190
-0.127
-0.163
-0.227*
(0.142)
(0.146)
(0.126)
(0.125)
Internet Penetration
-0.0101
0.00384
-0.0205
-0.0139
(0.0167)
(0.0175)
(0.0157) (0.0168)
Regional Dummies
East Asia & Pacific
-0.0838
-0.953
0.140
1.091
(1.088)
(1.048)
(0.829)
(0.979)
Europe & Central Asia
0.386
0.0562
1.832**
1.328
(1.142)
(1.098)
(0.851)
(0.986)
Latin America & Caribbean
0.202
0.272
1.223
1.724*
(1.103)
(1.055)
(0.861)
(0.951)
Middle East & North Africa
-0.162
-1.122
0.236
1.568
(1.118)
(1.076)
(0.878)
(0.993)
North America
-1.057
-4.917***
0.769
0.250
(1.808)
(1.611)
(1.372)
(1.417)
Sub-Saharan Africa
-0.564
-0.754
0.286
1.023
(0.987)
(0.947)
(0.707)
(0.821)
Log Likelihood
-453.837 -435.583
-588.554 -554.567
LR chi2
109.07
122.35
97.04
172.29
Pseudo R2
0.1073
0.1231
0.0762
0.1345
Observations of elections
111
111
135
135
Note: Standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
ln(GDP per capita)
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To assess the impact of the “electronic tabulation,” on election administration, I harvested
“delay” and a “fair count” from PEI’s sub-category, “vote count.” Both variables are measured on
a 5-point scale, where higher values denote greater election integrity. I then regressed them on
“electronic tabulation.” Model 11 and 12 in Table 9 presents the summary of ordered logistics
regressions. The results in both models reveal the negative impact on e-tabulation on “delay” and
“fair count.” However, only the relationship with “fair count” is statistically significant, which
indicates that countries, where electronic tabulations are used for processing results in elections
are more likely to have levels of perceived fairness of vote counting.
Finally, the findings of different estimated models suggest that the application of
“biometric data at polling stations” and “electronic tabulation” in elections tend to have a pervasive
and statistically consistent impact on improving perceived electoral integrity. These findings
provide evidence regarding the hopes and hype of techno-enthusiasts and indicate that some types
of ICTs tend to be more impactful in ameliorating perceived electoral integrity while others have
a marginal impact and tend to drain resources. Given the complexity of elections, EMBs need to
assess the relevance and optimal benefits of these ICTs before investing in these technologies. The
structural capacity and socio-political contexts, as well as stakeholders’ perceptions, need to be
considered before any procurement decision.
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Chapter 5: Conclusion

Holding elections is a complex process, involving massive challenges of logistics – voter
registration, hundreds and thousands of candidates, voting equipment, distribution of ballots, the
transmission of results, scattered polling stations and poll workers, massive amounts of paperwork,
and thorny issues of electoral laws. At the time of writing, the COVID-19pandemic continues to
impact our lives and societies in unprecedented ways, these challenges have been reinforced even
more, although it is too early to pinpoint how this global outbreak will shape elections in 2020 and
the future. As of early 2020, owing to the catastrophic consequences of this global public health
crisis (COVID-19), elections worldwide have been canceled, postponed, or held under stringent
health measures to contain the viral transmission of the virus. These enormous challenges to
elections put pressure on electoral administrators, legislators, and policymakers to ponder
alternative voting procedures, reconsider election timelines, and implement health safety measures
to conduct free, fair, and credible elections. The reeling of effect of these changes on democracy
and elections has yet to be assessed, but the coronavirus, once again, has strengthened the debate
related to the convenience, accessibility, and participation in elections, and the overall perceptions
of electoral integrity.
EMBs across the globe are reviewing voting processes, as countries struggle to hold safe,
fair, free, and participatory elections. Nonetheless, the times seem to favor ICT enthusiasts as we
witness an increased eagerness to use digital technology in elections. We have observed growing
enthusiasm for use of online/Internet voting and voting by mail during the COVID-19 pandemic.
ICT enthusiasts want to leverage digital technology to allow voting from home while maintaining
a safe social distance. The ICT realists are weighing voting by mail as a reasonable option during
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the challenging times of COVID-19. ICT skeptics argue that both online voting and voting by mail
need enormous resources to handle millions of extra ballots and count these while upholding the
health and safety of voters, polling staff and managers. There are also serious doubts about whether
ICTs can uphold the security and reliability of online voting. As political contexts and state-level
capacity vary across countries, it is hard to predict these new measures will be universally accepted
and implemented.
While describing elections during the COVID pandemic is beyond the scope of this
dissertation, the resurgence of the debate about ICTs and electoral integrity reflects the embedded
duality of the digitized electoral process – the use of ICTs offers new promises as well as brings
new vulnerabilities.
This dissertation examines the impact of some types of ICTs in elections to assess whether
these new technologies can improve perceptions of electoral integrity. I estimated multilevel
mixed-effects ordered logistics models and ran a series of regressions involving explanatory
variables about the current use of ICTs in four areas of the electoral process: voter registration,
voter identification, electronic tabulation of election results, and electronic transmission and
publication of election results.
Figure 3 below presents the conundrum related to the digitization of elections and
perception of electoral integrity. I tested different models (ordered probit and ordered logistic) to
distinguish the impact of each explanatory variable on the regressand rating (experts’ judgements
about the quality of elections on a 10-point scale) and examined the robustness of the preliminary
findings through a series of tests. The findings indicate that countries using biometric data in voter
identification at polling stations are more likely to have elections with higher levels of perceived
electoral integrity. Contrastingly, the regression results revealed that countries using electronic
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tabulation for processing results are more likely to have elections with decreased levels of
perceived electoral integrity.
Figure 3: Digitization and Electoral Integrity Conundrums

Biomteric Data at Polling Stations
Countries using "biometric data" in
voter identification at polling stations
are more likely to have elections with
higher levels of perceived electoral
integrity.

Electronic Tabulation
Countries using "electronic tabulation"
for processing results are more likely to
have elections with decreased levels of
perceived electoral integrity

These mixed findings (Figure 3) shed light on the potential of ICTs in elections (hopes) as
well as showcase new vulnerabilities in using these technologies (hype). More importantly, these
results indicate that some types of ICTs tend to have a greater positive impact on perceived
electoral integrity while others tend to have a negative impact and tend to drain resources. While
biometric voter registration, e-poll books, and online voter registration are positively correlated
with perceptions of electoral integrity, these relationships are not statistically significant enough
to draw a decisive conclusion.
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Limitations and Policy Implications
The findings raise additional questions and necessitate further research. At this point, it is
important, however, to list some conspicuous challenges that were encountered in processing and
analyzing electoral integrity data. The relationships I examined between the use of ICTs and the
perception of electoral integrity do not, unfortunately, have sources of data that line up consistently
on a year by year basis. Each country follows a different electoral calendar, which substantially
limited the ability to gather a year-to-year comparison of data on elections across the world. This
data issue could not be fixed, and this issue with data needs to be acknowledged. To offset this
data challenge, I was careful to ensure that explanatory ICT variables and the outcome variable
(rating) were compiled at around the same time. I extracted rating from PEI’s 6.5 release, which
covers 2,961 experts who evaluated 260 national elections in 161 countries from 1 July 2012 to 30
June 2017. All ICT variables were collected from International IDEA’s ICT in Elections, which
was initially gathered from 2014 to 2016 and updated later, eventually resulting in a time series.
Readers might question why I found PEI data uniquely compelling and useful when I could
extract a separate dependent variable from other data sources such as Varieties of Democracy (VDem) to test the robustness of preliminary findings. Despite having the intention to extract
outcome variables from other data sources, I could not find a suitable one that was equally
comparable to rating measured on a 10-point scale or similar. A variable in V-Dem data, “overall
quality of election,” which asks, “Do the election results represent the will of the people?” (V8
Codebook, 2018, p. 292), was interesting, but measured on a 0-1, binary scale. Unfortunately, the
variable did not seem to be compelling because of the substance of the survey question. It measures
“will” of the people and not the integrity of elections. As such, theoretically, these two questions
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did not seem to be comparable. PEI’s “rating of electoral integrity” is the only variable that
measures integrity worldwide involving the entire election cycle.
This study is a preliminary attempt to evaluate the impact of ICTs in elections; however,
much work remains to be done. A panel analysis could strengthen the findings, but both datasets
that I used are relatively new and do not have time-variant observations. Reverse causality of the
research question also remains a limitation. These issues need to be examined in the future as data
from these sources evolve. As the digitization of the electoral process is increasing worldwide,
experts’ survey-based datasets need to include a separate section or category on ICTs in elections
to assess the potential of digital technologies and vulnerabilities. These longitudinal surveys might
be useful for future research to understand the intersection between ICTs and the quality of
elections.
Nonetheless, the findings of this dissertation have significant policy ramifications. It puts
into question the tendency among electoral administrators to have blind reliance on ICTs. EMBs
must be cautiously optimistic in digitizing the electoral process, involving all election stakeholders
to weigh the benefits and costs of ICT as well as to devise ways to safeguard digital vulnerabilities.
Protecting electoral integrity in the digital age demands a sustained commitment and substantial
resources for capacity building and cyber training of electoral staff. Legislators and electoral
administrators need to identify the opportunities of digital technology for strengthening electoral
integrity and craft strategies to address potential digital vulnerabilities such as hacking and
disinformation around the use of these technologies. A needs-based approach is important to assess
whether countries have the requisite IT infrastructure and human resource capacity in place before
launching any digitization of the electoral process.
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Unless these technologies are vetted and piloted, digitization of the electoral process might
create a dangerous trap. Once the equipment is purchased, it will tend to be used despite high costs
involving the upkeep and updates of these technologies. Hacking, technical breakdown of these
technologies, and programming errors might significantly undermine electoral integrity and reduce
voters’ trust in the democratic process. As such, before procuring ICT technology, key parameters
like associated costs, the integrity of these technologies, and voters’ trust, security, and long-term
sustainability need to be assessed. While EMBs across the globe need to develop national
cybersecurity capacity, as the threats to electoral integrity often stem from transnational sources
with targeted disinformation and cyber campaigns, international bodies like the United Nations
should consider creating an international team of cyber experts readily deployable to provide
technical assistance. This support can be set up under a global electoral assistance program,
potentially in collaboration with Non-Governmental Organizations like IDEA and the Carter
Center.
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Appendix A: Electoral Integrity Data
Country
Afghanistan
Albania
Algeria
Angola
Argentina
Armenia
Australia
Austria
Azerbaijan
Bahamas
Bahrain
Bangladesh
Barbados
Belarus
Belgium
Belize
Benin
Bhutan
Bolivia
Bosnia
Botswana
Brazil
Bulgaria
Burkina Faso
Burundi
Cambodia
Cameroon
Canada
Cape Verde
Central African Republic
Chad
Chile
Colombia
Comoros
Congo, Rep.
Costa Rica
Croatia
Cuba

Code
AFG
ALB
DZA
AGO
ARG
ARM
AUS
AUT
AZE
BHS
BHR
BGD
BRB
BLR
BEL
BLZ
BEN
BTN
BOL
BIH
BWA
BRA
BGR
BFA
BDI
KHM
CMR
CAN
CPV
CAF
TCD
CHL
COL
COM
COG
CRI
HRV
CUB

Ccow
700
339
615
540
160
371
900
305
373
31
692
771
53
370
211
80
434
760
145
346
571
140
355
439
516
811
471
20
402
482
483
155
100
581
484
94
344
40

Election
AFG_14062014_P2
ALB_23062013_L1
DZA_04052017_L1
AGO_23082017_L1
ARG_22102017_L1
ARM_02042017_L1
AUS_07092013_L1
AUT_04122016_P2
AZE_01112015_L1
BHS_10052017_L1
BHR_29112014_L2
BGD_05012014_L1
BRB_21022013_L1
BLR_11102015_P1
BEL_25052014_L1
BLZ_04112015_L1
BEN_20032016_P2
BTN_13072013_L2
BOL_12102014_P1
BIH_12102014_P1
BWA_24102014_L1
BRA_26102014_P2
BGR_05102014_L1
BFA_02122012_L1
BDI_29062015_L1
KHM_28072013_L1
CMR_30092013_L1
CAN_19102015_L1
CPV_02102016_P1
CAF_14022016_P2
TCD_10042016_P1
CHL_15122013_P2
COL_09032014_L1
COM_10042016_P2
COG_30072017_L2
CRI_01042018_P2
HRV_08112015_L1

Rating
2.33
6.49
3.99
7.83
4.74
8.76
8.60
2.52
6.67
2.50
3.06
6.67
3.25
8.67
6.75
8.23
7.00
6.91
6.33
7.60
8.77
6.74
8.22
1.38
3.80
6.00
9.08
8.90
7.00
2.33
8.84
7.33
5.35
1.56
9.63
7.64
5.67
94

Cyprus
Czech Republic
Denmark
Djibouti
Dominican Republic
Ecuador
Egypt
El Salvador
Equatorial Guinea
Estonia
Ethiopia
Fiji
Finland
France
Gabon
Gambia
Georgia
Germany
Ghana
Greece
Grenada
Guatemala
Guinea
Guinea-Bissau
Guyana
Haiti
Honduras
Hungary
Iceland
India
Indonesia
Iran
Iraq
Ireland
Israel
Italy
Ivory Coast
Jamaica
Japan
Jordan
Kazakhstan

CYP
CZE
DNK
DJI
DOM
ECU
EGY
SLV
GNQ
EST
ETH
FJI
FIN
FRA
GAB
GMB
GEO
DEU
GHA
GRC
GRD
GTM
GIN
GNB
GUY
HTI
HND
HUN
ISL
IND
IDN
IRN
IRQ
IRL
ISR
ITA
CIV
JAM
JPN
JOR
KAZ

352
316
390
522
42
130
651
92
411
366
530
950
375
220
481
420
372
255
452
350
55
90
438
404
110
41
91
310
395
750
850
630
645
205
666
325
437
51
740
663
705

CYP_04022018_P2
CZE_13102012_S1
DNK_18062015_L1
DJI_08042016_P1
DOM_15052016_P1
ECU_02042017_P2
EGY_02122015_L1
SLV_09032014_P2
GNQ_26052013_L1
EST_01032015_L1
ETH_24052015_L1
FJI_17092014_L1
FIN_19042015_L1
FRA_07052017_P2
GBN_27082016_P2
GMB_01122016_P1
GEO_01102012_L1
DEU_22092013_L1
GHA_07122012_P1
GRC_20092015_L1
GRD_13032018_L1
GTM_25102015_P2
GIN_11102015_P1
GNB_18052014_P2
GUY_11052015_L1
HTI_20112016_P1
HND_24112013_P1
HUN_08042018_L1
ISL_25062016_P1
IND_12052014_L1
IDN_09042014_L1
IRN_26022016_L1
IRQ_12052018_L1
ISL_25062016_P1
ISR_17032015_L1
ITA_04032018_L1
CIV_18122016_L1
JAM_25022016_L1
JPN_10072016_L1
JOR_23012013_L1
KAZ_20032016_L1

8.63
8.65
9.78
2.68
5.70
5.63
4.67
6.50
1.95
8.89
1.59
5.35
9.88
9.03
2.89
7.33
7.46
9.38
8.40
8.62
8.83
5.44
5.13
6.88
7.14
3.25
4.60
5.31
9.68
7.25
7.01
5.52
5.00
8.81
8.84
8.33
7.11
8.27
8.43
6.38
3.94
95

Kenya
Korea
Kuwait
Kyrgyzstan
Laos
Latvia
Lesotho
Lithuania
Macedonia
Madagascar
Malawi
Malaysia
Maldives
Mali
Malta
Mauritania
Mauritius
Mexico
Micronesia
Moldova
Mongolia
Montenegro
Morocco
Mozambique
Myanmar
Namibia
Nepal
Netherlands
New Zealand
Nicaragua
Niger
Nigeria
Norway
Oman
Pakistan
Panama
Paraguay
Peru
Philippines
Poland
Portugal

KEN
KOR
KWT
KGZ
LAO
LVA
LSO
LTU
MKD
MDG
MWI
MYS
MDV
MLI
MLT
MRT
MUS
MEX
FSM
MDA
MNG
MNE
MAR
MOZ
MMR
NAM
NPL
NLD
NZL
NIC
NER
NGA
NOR
OMN
PAK
PAN
PRY
PER
PHL
POL
PRT

501
732
690
703
812
367
570
368
343
580
553
820
781
432
338
435
590
70
987
359
712
341
600
541
775
565
790
210
920
93
436
475
385
698
770
95
150
135
840
290
235

KEN_04032013_P1
KOR_13042016_L1
KWT_01122012_L1
KGZ_04102015_L1
LAO_20032016_L1
LVA_04102014_L1
LSO_03062017_L1
LTU_09102016_L1
MKD_11122016_L1
MDG_20122013_P2
MWI_20052014_P1
MYS_05052013_L1
MDV_16112013_P2
MLI_11082013_P2
MLT_03062017_L1
MRT_21062014_P1
MUS_10122014_L1
MEX_01072012_P1
FSM_03032015_L1
MDA_30112014_L1
MNG_07072017_P2
MNE_07042013_P1
MAR_07102016_L1
MOZ_15102014_P1
MMR_08112015_L1
NAM_28112014_P1
NPL_07122017_L1
NLD_12092012_L1
NZL_20092014_L1
NIC_06112016_P1
NER_20032016_P2
NGA_28032015_L1
NOR_09092013_L1
OMN_25102015_L1
PAK_11052013_L1
PAN_04052014_P1
PRY_21042013_P1
PER_05062016_P2
PHL_09052016_P1
POL_24052015_P2
PRT_04102015_L1

4.43
8.57
5.98
7.14
2.50
8.19
7.28
8.75
5.31
4.19
5.07
3.53
6.20
5.64
8.05
4.42
8.50
6.41
7.42
6.47
7.28
4.99
6.00
3.88
6.81
6.71
7.00
8.94
9.15
2.00
6.00
6.33
9.62
7.00
6.44
6.88
6.75
6.95
6.74
8.67
8.95
96

Romania
Russia
Rwanda
Samoa
Sao Tome & Principe
Serbia
Sierra Leone
Singapore
Slovak Republic
Slovenia
Solomon Islands
South Africa
Spain
Sri Lanka
Sudan
Suriname
Swaziland
Sweden
Switzerland
Syria
Taiwan
Tajikistan
Tanzania
Thailand
Timor-Leste
Togo
Tonga
Tunisia
Turkey
Turkmenistan
Uganda
Ukraine
United Kingdom
United States
Uruguay
Uzbekistan
Vanuatu
Venezuela
Vietnam
Zambia
Zimbabwe

ROU
RUS
RWA
WSM
STP
SRB
SLE
SGP
SVK
SVN
SLB
ZAF
ESP
LKA
SDN
SUR
SWZ
SWE
CHE
SYR
TJK
TZA
THA
TLS
TGO
TON
TUN
TUR
TKM
UGA
UKR
GBR
USA
URY
UZB
VUT
VEN
VNM
ZMB
ZWE

360
365
517
990
403
345
451
830
317
349
940
560
230
780
625
115
572
380
225
652
713
702
510
800
860
461
955
616
640
701
500
369
200
2
165
704
935
101
816
551
552

ROU_09122012_L1
RUS_18032018_P1
RWA_04082017_P1
WSM_04032016_L1
STP_07082016_P2
SRB_02042017_P1
SLE_17112012_P1
SGP_11092015_L1
SVK_05032016_L1
SVN_02122012_P2
SLB_19112014_L1
ZAF_07052014_L1
ESP_20122015_L1
LKA_08012015_P1
SDN_13042015_P1
SUR_25052015_L1
SWZ_20092013_L1
SWE_14092014_L1
CHE_18102015_L1
SYR_03062014_P1
TWN_16012016_P1
TJK_01032015_L1
TZA_25102015_P1
THA_02022014_L1
TLS_12052018_L1
TGO_25072013_L1
TON_16112017_L1
TUN_21122014_P2
TUR_01112015_L1
TKM_12022017_P1
UGA_18022016_P1
UKR_25052014_P1
GBR_07052015_L1
USA_04112014_L1
URY_30112014_P2
UZB_04012015_L2
VUT_22012016_L1
VEN_06122015_L1
VNM_22052016_L1
ZMB_11082016_P1
ZWE_31072013_L1

7.59
3.77
6.71
8.00
6.54
5.72
5.79
8.57
8.14
6.63
7.50
8.34
7.56
3.67
6.36
4.57
9.38
9.25
1.56
9.14
3.01
5.36
4.93
7.47
2.92
9.00
7.97
6.06
1.82
3.42
6.92
8.39
7.30
9.38
2.22
7.13
4.08
3.00
5.26
3.69
97

